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THE PRISON JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE
THURGOOD MARSHALL
MELVIN GUTTERMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In these times of increasingly violent behavior, convicted felons
are a friendless group, whose plight engenders little political support.'
Ever since the Supreme Court began to actively examine daily prison
life, Justice Thurgood Marshall labored to make his colleagues aware
of the Court's obligation to provide decent living conditions to those
citizens whom the state seeks to punish by incarceration. As the first
African American on the Court,2 his special voice advanced the de-
bate. A review of Justice Marshall's prison jurisprudence demon-
strates his belief that all persons, even disfavored minorities, are
entitled to the Court's protection of their basic rights. He had a
sense, perhaps more than most of his colleagues, that there are real
people living in the overcrowded facilities and that they matter.3 He
* Professor of Law, Emory University. BA, University of Michigan; J.D., Brooklyn
Law School; L.L.M., Northwestern University. I am grateful to Angela R. Miller for her
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1. SeeRhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 377 (1981) (Marshall,J., dissenting) ("In the
current climate, it is unrealistic to expect legislators to care whether the prisons are over-
crowded or harmful to inmate health."); Judy Keen & Leslie Phillips, House Passes Crime
Bill, U.SA TODAY, Aug. 22, 1994, at Al, available in 1994 WL 11094680.
2. Thurgood Marshall was born on July 2, 1908, in Baltimore, Maryland. See Resolu-
tions in Tribute of the Late Justice Thurgood Marshall, 114 S. Ct. IV (1993) [hereinafter
Resolutions]. He graduated with honors from Lincoln University in 1929 and graduated
first in his class at the Howard University School of Law in 1933. See id. at V. His most
notable accomplishments before ascending to the Court involved his work for the NAACP
and the establishment of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Inc. See id. He engineered the
dismantling of racial segregation in the nation's public schools, culminating in the
landmark decisions of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1) and Browm
v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown I!). See Resolutions, supra, at VI. Mar-
shall's work as a civil rights lawyer is examined extensively in MARX V. TUSHNET, MAKING
CML RIGHTS LAw: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961 (1994).
In 1967 President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed Marshall to the Supreme Court of
the United States, see Resolutions, supra at IX, a position he held for 24 years until his
retirement in 1991. See id. at III. Justice Marshall died in Bethesda, Maryland on January
24, 1993. See id.
In 1929 Thurgood Marshall was denied admission to the all white University of Mary-
land School of Law. See id. at V. On October 9, 1980, the law school named its law library
in honor of Justice Marshall. Justice Marshall did not attend the dedication.
3. See, e.g., Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 369-77 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall was
the sole dissenter in Rhodes, arguing that the facility described by the majority was not the
one in which the prisoners actually lived. id. at 369-70. He agreed with the district court
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was opposed to those prison practices and conditions that kept
human beings from living a decent existence. He was not against in-
carceration, or even harsh punishment; he was simply in favor of ap-
plying constitutional rights and protections as much as possible in the
prison setting.4
Justice Marshall understood that "the needs for identity and self-
respect are more compelling in the dehumanizing prison environ-
ment."5 From the beginning of his tenure on the Court, he tried to
protect those precious personal freedoms by which the inmate may
capture the human spirit. He sought to educate the public that:
When the prison gates slam behind an inmate, he does not
lose his human quality; his mind does not become closed to
ideas; his intellect does not cease to feed on a-free and open
interchange of opinions; his yearning for self-respect does
not end; nor is his quest for self-realization concluded.6
Justice Marshall recognized that by moving the Constitution into
the correctional facility, he could redefine the relationship between
the imprisoned and his jailor and help mold the society in which they
and we live. He applauded the activist role of the federal bench and
vigorously opposed the Court's deference approach.' He confronted
the bleakness of daily prison existence, trying to bring prison life into
contact with the outside world.'
Marshall's experience as a young lawyer representing black de-
fendants surely accounted for his passion for prison reform. 9 He,
that the permanent practice of "double ceiling" at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility
(SOCF) constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 375. For a discussion of Rhodes,
see infra notes 55-104 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., id. at 377 ("A society must punish those who transgress its rules. When the
offense is severe, the punishment should be of proportionate severity. But the punishment
must always be administered within the limitations set down by the Constitution.").
5. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 428 (1974) (Marshall,J., concurring), overruled
in part by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 375 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (warning that "the major-
ity's admonitions might eviscerate the federal courts' traditional role of preventing a State
from imposing cruel and unusual punishment through its conditions of confinement").
8. See, e.g., Martinez, 416 U.S. at 422-28 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that a pris-
oner's mail provides an essential tie to the outside world and should be afforded a degree
of privacy).
9. See Tracey Maclin, Justice Thurgood Marshall: Taking the Fourth Amendment Seriously,
77 CORNELL L. REV. 723, 726-27 (1992) ("Marshall's experiences as a young lawyer con-
fronting police officials and representing black defendants probably account for some of
his views on the death penalty, the relevance of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination to police interrogation practices, and the importance of the Sixth Amend-
ment's guarantee of effective counsel in criminal cases.") (footnotes omitted).
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more than any of his colleagues, understood the impact of the prison
system on the African-American community."0 Perhaps, like his suc-
cessor, Justice Clarence Thomas, he thought he could walk in the
shoes of the prisoners who are affected by what the Court does."
Despite his many years on the bench, at a time when the Court
was actively developing its prison jurisprudence, a good portion ofJus-
tice Marshall's philosophy is expressed in dissenting opinions. 2 In
these opinions, he called the public's attention to the degrading cir-
cumstances of prison life.13 Justice Marshall's rulings continually chal-
lenged his colleagues to make the Constitution fulfill its promise to all
minorities. He left the bench with an enviable record of prison re-
form opinions. The objective of this Article is to explore Justice Mar-
shall's prison jurisprudence, confident that his message will resonate
in the future work of the Court.14
10. See generally Symposium, 200 Years of the Penitentiary: Criminal, Social and Economic
Justice, 34 How. L.J. 483 (1991) [hereinafter Symposium] (containing several articles ad-
dressing the impact of the prison system on the African-American community).
11. See Nomination ofJudge Clarence Thomas to Be Associate Justice of The Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciay, 102d Cong. 260 (1991) (state-
ment of Judge Clarence Thomas, nominee).
You know, on my current court, I have occasion to look out the window that
faces C Street, and there are converted buses that bring in the criminal defend-
ants to our criminal justice system, busload after busload. And you look out, and
you say to yourself, and I say to myself almost every day, But for the grace of God
there go 1.
So you feel that you have the same fate, or could have, as those individuals.
So I can walk in their shoes, and I can bring something different to the Court.
And I think it is a tremendous responsibility, and it is a humbling responsibility;
and it is one that, if confirmed, I will carry out to the best of my ability.
Id.
12. See, e.g., Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 596 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("[T] he Court has turned a deaf ear to inmates' claims that the conditions of their confine-
ment violate the Federal Constitution."); Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 372 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("[T]he State cannot impose punishment that violates 'the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.'" (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958) (plurality opinion))); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 241 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the death penalty "has as its very basis the total denial of the
wrongdoer's dignity and worth") (footnote omitted).
13. See supra note 12.
14. The ethic of Justice Marshall's prison jurisprudence is reflected in several recent
decisions of the Court. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1979 (1994) (holding
that a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment if he knows of and
disregards a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S.
25, 35 (1993) (holding that a prisoner's involuntary exposure to cigarette smoke can form
the basis of a claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment); see also infra notes 354-370
and accompanying text.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
II. OPENING A PATHWAY INTO THE PENITENTIARY
In the early years of the Republic, courts simply did not conceive
of the Constitution as protecting prisoners from harsh treatment.1 5
The criminal offender was regarded as a "slave of the State."' 6 More
recently, the judicial attitude supported a policy of noninterference in
prison affairs. This policy, generally referred to as the "hands-off'
doctrine, made it virtually impossible for prisoners to get judicial re-
lief from harsh living conditions and needlessly cruel punishment.'7
There were numerous occasions when courts absolutely refused to
consider the severe and demeaning conditions of prison life.' 8 The
judiciary explained that it had no role in regulating prisons.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, federal judges began to learn
about the barbaric conditions in state penitentiaries.19 Their expo-
sure to the horrors committed in prisons resulted in a general shift in
prisoners' rights jurisprudence away from the traditional hands-off
doctrine." The most striking development in prison law was the fed-
eral bench's recognition that state prisoners were entitled to mini-
mum constitutional standards during confinement.2 ' A minor
revolution occurred, and the principal means used to secure decent
prison conditions resulted from interpretation of the Cruel and Unu-
sual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment.2 Going beyond
15. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
16. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
17. For a historical review of the "hands-off" doctrine, see Note, Beyond the Ken of the
Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE LJ. 506
(1963).
18. See, e.g., Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771, 771 (10th Cir. 1954) (per curiam)
("Courts are without power to supervise prison administration or to interfere with the ordi-
nary prison rules or regulations.").
19. See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 378-81 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (describing de-
grading and disgusting conditions), aftd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
20. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 681 (1978) (approving the lower court's
comprehensive order demanding changes in the prison system); Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 105 (1976) (concluding that "deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness
or injury states a cause of action under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983"); Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d
388, 403 (10th Cir. 1977) (recognizing the need for federal intervention where "there is
displayed a clear failure by the State to take cognizance of an inmate's valid federal consti-
tutional rights"); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1321-22 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that
inhumane prison conditions and practices amounted to "gross constitutional violations"
and justified the court's equitable remedies).
21. For a general discussion of the rise of the American penitentiary system and the
development of prisoners' rights, see Melvin Gutterman, Prison Objectives and Human Dig
nity: Reaching a Mutual Accommodation, 1992 BYU L. REv. 857 (1992).
22. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII. For a comprehensive analysis of Eighth Amendment prison jurisprudence, see Mel-
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their traditional role, federal judges examined prisons in great detail,
fashioning remedies that touched on nearly every aspect of prison life
and ordering comprehensive reform.23
Justice Marshall certainly was aware of Chief Judge Henley's dis-
covery regarding the archaic prison system in Arkansas, where "con-
finement in the Penitentiary involve[d] living under degrading and
disgusting conditions."24 Prisoners were tortured by electrical shocks
and beaten with leather straps.25 Faced with the threat of death, they
were forced to work ten hours a day, six days a week, sometimes in
inclement weather and without adequate clothing.26 "Trusty guards"
had control over the life and death of the inmate.27 It was within their
power to murder an inmate with impunity.28 Trying to escape forcible
sexual violence and stabbing, the inmates in the barracks would "cling
to the bars all night." 9 A sentence in the Arkansas penitentiary
amounted to "banishment from civilized society to a dark and evil
world completely alien to the free world.""0
Surely, Justice Marshall also read Chief Judge Frank Johnson's
opinion detailing the severely overcrowded conditions of Alabama's
vin Gutterman, The Contours of Eighth Amendment Prison Jurisprudence: Conditions of Confine-
ment, 48 SMU L. REv. 373 (1995).
23. See Michael S. Feldberg, Comment, Confronting the Conditions of Confinement: An
Expanded Role for Courts in Prison Reform, 12 HAgv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 367, 368 (1977) (noting
that courts found wide-ranging prisoner protections under the First, Eighth, and Four-
teenth Amendments).
24. Holt, 309 F. Supp. at 381.
25. See id. at 372.
26. See id. at 370.
27. A "trusty guard" is an inmate with administrative responsibilities. See i. at 373-76.
28. See id. at 374. Prisoners at Parchman, a Mississippi state penitentiary, experienced
similar destructive conditions. See Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 887-92 (N.D. Miss.
1972), affd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974). The danger of prisoner mistreatment by armed
trusty guards and other inmates forced a federal judge to find the housing at Parchman
"unfit for human habitation under any modem concept of decency. The facilities at all
camps for the disposal of human and other waste are shockingly inadequate and present
an immediate health hazard." Id. at 887. Regarding the competency of the trusty guards,
the court stated:
Penitentiary records indicate that many of the armed trusties have been con-
victed of violent crimes, and that of the armed trusties serving as of April 1, 1971,
35% had not been psychologically tested, 40% of those tested were found to be
retarded, and 71% of those tested were found to have personality disorders.
Id. at 889.
29. Holt 309 F. Supp. at 377.
30. Id. at 381. Even today, remnants of the brutal power exercised by trusties and con-
doned by prison officials survive. See Aric Press, Inside America's Toughest Prison, NEWSWEEK,
Oct. 6, 1986, at 46 (telling the gripping story of brutal treatment of Texas penitentiary
inmates).
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penitentiaries'l-a penal system in which inmates were required to
sleep on mattresses placed on the floors in hallways and next to
urinals."2 Food was often infested with insects and served without ade-
quate utensils.33 In Alabama jails, inmates were raped and assaulted
on a daily basis.3 4
Penal institutions had lost their rehabilitative purpose; neverthe-
less, they continued to serve their purely custodial function as a ware-
house for the convicted.3 5 Lower federal court judges had seen and
had tried to deal with the complicated and intractable problems in
state penitentiaries. By the time the Supreme Court agreed to con-
sider the principles relevant to prison confinement claims, Justice
Marshall knew that conditions within many American prisons made
the system a national disgrace. He learned that entire prison systems
in at least twenty-four states had been declared unconstitutional.3 6 As
the Court was slowly being pulled into the arena, Justice Marshall was
fully aware of the need to reform the prisons.37
In one of his first prisoners' rights opinions, Bounds v. Smith,
Justice Marshall strove to ensure that unschooled, indigent inmates
31. See Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 322 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (mem.), aff'd en banc sub
nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part per curiam sub nom.
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978).
32. See id. at 323.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 324. For an examination of the doctrinal basis of Pugh, see Ira P. Robbins
& Michael B. Buser, Punitive Conditions of Prison Confinement: An Analysis of Pugh v. Locke
and Federal Court Supervision of State Penal Administration Under the Eighth Amendment, 29
STAN. L. REv. 893 (1977).
35. See DAVIDJ. RoTHmAN, THE DiscovERY OF THE ASYLUM 255 (1971).
36. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 353-54 n.1 (1981) (Brennan,J., concurring)
(listing the states in which prisons or prison systems had been placed under court order
because of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment challenges).
37. Prison conditions opinions, such as the following, abounded with dismay and
moral outrage:
This memorandum opinion has, at some length, cited and summarized the
evidence indicating the existence of these constitutional violations. But it is im-
possible for a written opinion to convey the pernicious conditions and the pain
and degradation which ordinary inmates suffer within TDC prison walls-the
gruesome experiences of youthful first offenders forcibly raped; the cruel and
justifiable fears of inmates, wondering when they will be called upon to defend
the next violent assault; the sheer misery, the discomfort, the wholesale loss of
privacy for prisoners housed with one, two, or three others in a forty-five foot cell
or suffocatingly packed together in a crowded dormitory; the physical suffering
and wretched psychological stress which must be endured by those sick or injured
who cannot obtain adequate medical care ....
Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1391 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (mem.), modified per cur/am, 650
F.2d 555 (5th Cir. Unit AJune 1981).
38. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
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have meaningful access to the courts.3 9 He sought to place before the
courts, and ultimately the public, these inmates' claims of abuse of
power and unconstitutional conditions of confinement.4" Justice Mar-
shall believed an informed citizenry would improve our prisons.4" To
promote the inmates' cause, he imposed an affirmative duty on prison
officials "to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful
legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or ade-
quate assistance from persons trained in the law."4" He believed that
a pro se inmate needs essential research tools as much as any lawyer.4"
To the lament that it was too expensive, Marshall's reply was straight-
forward: "[T] he cost of protecting a constitutional right cannotjustify
its total denial."' Bounds opened the federal dockets to prisoners
with complaints of mistreatment and deprivation of constitutional
rights.45 Most important, Bounds proclaimed that prisoners had a
"fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts." '
III. PRISON OVERCROWDING: DETERIORATION OF THE INMATES'
MENTAL AND PHYSICAL HEALTH
Although the State has the power to punish, the Eighth Amend-
ment stands to ensure that this power is exercised within the limits of
civilized standards.47 The Supreme Court has stated: "The basic con-
cept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dig-
nity of man."" Marshall's close colleague, Justice Brennan,
concluded that in death penalty cases the State "must treat its mem-
39. See id. at 821-32.
40. See id.
41. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 232 (1976) (Marshall,J., dissenting) (stat-
ing that a public "fully informed as to the purposes of the death penalty and its liabilities,
would. . . reject it as morally unacceptable").
42. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828.
43. Id. at 825-26.
44. Id. at 825.
45. See id. at 825, 827.
46. Id. at 828. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist criticized the Court's an-
nouncement in Bounds as being "created virtually out of whole cloth with little or no refer-
ence to the Constitution from which it is supposed to be derived." Id. at 840 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
The Court shed light on Bounds in Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1996), holding that
to establish a Bounds violation, an inmate must demonstrate an "actual injury." Casey, 116
S. Ct. at 2180. "Insofar as the right indicated by Bounds is concerned, 'meaningful access to
the courts is the touchstone' and the inmate therefore must go one step further and
demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hin-
dered his efforts to pursue a legal claim." Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Bounds, 430 U.S.
at 823).
47. See generaly Gutterman, supra note 22.
48. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion).
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bers with respect for their intrinsic worth as human beings. A punish-
ment [such as the death penalty] is 'cruel and unusual,' therefore, if it
does not comport with human dignity. 49
These concepts underlie not only Eighth Amendment death pen-
alty issues; Justice Marshall considered them to be a suitable test to
measure those values retained in the prison setting.5" Marshall was
always mindful of the State's obligation to treat its prisoners with de-
cency and humanity.51 He realized that demeaning and demoralizing
prisoners is the worst way to prepare them for the outside world. It
was evident to him that prison practices affect more than the integrity
of the body; they influence the soul of the prisoner-his status as a
person deserving some quantum of respect.52
In the Supreme Court's first full-fledged opportunity to review
prison conditions,5" the Justices split on the role the federal judiciary
should play in state corrections.54 Rhodes v. Chapman55 presented an
easy target for the Court majority bent on controlling the activist role
of the federal bench. The Southern Ohio Correctional Facility
(SOCF), the only maximum security prison in Ohio, was described by
the district court, "from a brick and mortar viewpoint," as "unques-
49. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
50. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 372-73 (1981) (Marshall,J., dissenting) (not-
ing that prison conditions should be measured against standards of decency).
51. See id. at 372.
52. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 428 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring), over-
ruled in part by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
53. Although the Court, in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), established that prison
officials had an obligation to provide medical care to inmates and that "deliberate indiffer-
ence to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton inflic-
tion of pain' proscribed by the Eighth Amendment," the decision advanced a relatively
narrow principle. Id. at 104 (citation omitted) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
173 (1976) (plurality opinion)). The Court in Rhodes believed it had a fresh slate on which
to consider prison conditions in the context of the Eighth Amendment. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at
344-45.
54. Prior to Rhodes, Bell v. Wofish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), was the Court's most important
prison conditions case. In Wolfish, the Court considered a number of corrections practices,
including double celling at the Metropolitan Correction Center (MCC) in New York. Id. at
530. This federal, short-term, custodial facility "was intended to include the most advanced
and innovative features of modem design of detention facilities." Id. at 525. The facility
had "no barred cells, dank, colorless corridors, or clanging steel gates." Id. Justice Rehn-
quist, writing for the majority, held that double celling at MCC was not unconstitutional,
thereby rejecting the notion that "there is some sort of 'one man, one cell' principle lurk-
ing in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 542. Noting the size of the
cells (seventy-five square feet), the short-term confinement period for most of the inmates,
and the amount of time the inmates could spend outside of their cells, the Court held that
double ceiling did not violate constitutional norms. Id. at 543. For a discussion of the
specific constitutional challenges involved in Wo4lsh, see infra notes 234-304 and accompa-
nying text
55. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
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tionably a top-flight, first-class facility."5 6 It was built in the early 1970s
and had a superior law library, as well as school facilities, workshops, a
forty-bed hospital, and outdoor recreational and visitation areas.57 Its
cells were approximately sixty-three square feet in size, containing a
bed, or bunkbed if double celled, in addition to a cabinet-type night-
stand, a wall cabinet, a lavatory with hot and cold running water, a
commode flushed from inside the cell, a radio, and a ventilation
duct." Each cell block contained a day room "'designed to furnish
that type of recreation or occupation which an ordinary citizen would
seek in his living room or den."'59 In short, SOCF was atypical of the
sort of institutions with which federal courts had traditionally been
involved. Its major failing was the practice of "double celling" prison-
ers because of overcrowding.6 ° By 1977, 1400 of the prison's 2300
inmates were sharing cells.61 The congestion had not overwhelmed
SOCF's facilities or staff.6 2 It had not significantly reduced the availa-
bility of space for visitation or for stays in the day rooms, nor had it
rendered the library resources inadequate, although inmate job op-
portunities had decreased.65 There was no indifference to medical or
dental needs by the staff, although there were isolated instances of
neglect.64 In spite of these "generally favorable findings," the district
court found double celling at SOCF to be cruel and unusual
punishment.65
The Supreme Court majority disagreed, finding no constitutional
mandate for "comfortable prisons."6 6 The majority emphasized that
prison conditions must be extreme to constitute cruel and unusual
punishment.67 Harsh prison conditions may be the penalty the in-
mate must pay for his crime.6" Double celling at SOCF did not in-
crease violence among inmates, nor did it "lead to deprivations of
essential food, medical care, or sanitation."69 The Court noted that
56. Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1009 (S.D. Ohio 1977), affd meM., 624 F.2d
1099 (6th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
57. See id. at 1010-11.
58. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 341.
59. Id. (quoting Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. at 1012).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 342-43.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 343.
66. Id. at 349.
67. Id. at 348-49.
68. Id. at 347.
69. Id. at 348.
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prison conditions must be judged by "'evolving standards of de-
cency' 70 and that whatever discomfort double ceiling might have
caused, it fell far short of violating the Constitution.7' Moreover,
Eighth Amendmentjudgments are not simply based on the subjective
values ofjudges, and although "aspiration [s] toward an ideal environ-
ment" may be appropriate, these considerations are more properly
weighed by the legislature and correctional authorities than by the
Court. 72 The Court determined that virtually all of the district court's
findings tended to refute, rather than support, the prisoners' claims
of cruel punishment.7 Finding no constitutional violations at SOCF,
the majority concluded that federal courts had no authority to decide
whether double ceiling was the best solution to the state's growing
prison population.74 To control the activist federal bench, the Rhodes
majority counseled caution and the need for deference to prison ad-
ministrators and state legislatures.7 5
Although eightJustices were in general agreement as to the result
in Rhodes, Justice Marshall clearly was not.76 From his perspective,
SOCF was not merely overpopulated; it was unhealthy and danger-
ous.
7 7 As the sole dissenter in Rhodes, he fervently disagreed that the
facility described by the majority was the one in which the prisoners
actually lived out their daily existence. 7' He believed it significant that
the prison was so severely overcrowded that it was operating at thirty-
eight percent above its design capacity.7 9 Moreover, double celling
was not a temporary solution at SOCF, but would continue for the
foreseeable future, with many of the facility's inmates spending most
of their time in their cells.8" Marshall saw this as more than just a case
concerning the constitutionality of double bunking.81
Frustrated with the majority's reading of the record, Justice Mar-
shall stated that it was "simply not true," as the majority claimed, that
there was no evidence that the prisoners had suffered "unnecessary or
wanton pain."82 Marshall was more impressed by "[t] he conclusion of
70. Id. at 346 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
71. Id. at 347-48.
72. Id. at 349.
73. Id. at 347-48.
74. Id. at 349-50.
75. Id. at 352.
76. See id. at 369-77 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 370.
78. Id. at 369-70.
79. Id. at 372.
80. Id. at 373.
81. See id. at 369-77.
82. Id. at 374.
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every expert who testified at trial and of every serious study ... that a
long-term inmate must have to himself, at the very least, 50 square feet
of floor space . . .in order to avoid serious mental, emotional, and
physical deterioration.""3 He agreed with the experts' testimony that
these "'close quarters"' would likely increase the incidents of mental
disorders and that double ceiling had increased tension and "'aggres-
sive and anti-social characteristics. '"'84 Two courts had already con-
cluded that overcrowding and double celling at SOCF were severe
enough to cause a deterioration of the prisoners' physical and mental
health.85 Marshall agreed with these courts that the permanent prac-
tice of double ceiling at SOCF was cruel and unusual punishment.8 6
He knew that prisoners had the capacity to progress or degenerate in
response to their environment.8 " Marshall intended for the Eighth
Amendment to protect the inmate from an environment where ex-
isting conditions made deterioration probable and progress toward
rehabilitation unlikely.88
Rhodes was significant in that it revealed the Justices' respective
positions in the battle over the federal judicial role in assessing state
prison conditions.89 The Court's jurisprudence was crystal clear. The
principles of federalism required a proper respect for a state's control
over its prisons-the federal courts may intervene in state correctional
matters, but only grudgingly, even in the face of extremely harsh
prison conditions.9" Rhodes effectively undermined the federal court
83. Id. at 371.
84. Id. at 374 n.7 (quoting Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1017 (S.D. Ohio
1977), aff'd mem., 624 F.2d 1099 (6th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 337 (1981)).
85. Id. at 375 (referring to the district court's decision in Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F.
Supp. 1007 (S.D. Ohio 1977) and to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's affirmance
of that opinion in Chapman v. Rhodes, 624 F.2d 1099 (6th Cir. 1980) (mem.)).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 393 (10th Cir. 1977). Drawing on Marshall's
opinion in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
asserted that the Eighth Amendment is "intended to protect and safeguard a prison inmate
from an environment where degeneration is probable and self-improvement unlikely be-
cause of the conditions existing which inflict needless suffering, whether physical or
mental." Battle, 564 F.2d at 393.
89. By its rhetoric and tone, Rhodes was meant to discourage activism by the lower fed-
eral courts. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 351-52. However, several Justices were apprehensive
that the wrong message was being sent. See id. at 352-68 (Brennan, J., concurring), 368-69
(Blackmun,J., concurring), 369-77 (Marshall,J., dissenting). Justice Brennan emphasized
that Rhodes should not be considered a retreat from the lower federal courts' careful scru-
tiny of prison conditions. Id. at 353 (Brennan, J., concurring).
90. See Gutterman, supra note 21, at 901-05.
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leadership that had pressed for physical improvements in state prisons
across the nation.91
The Rhodes majority added to the Eighth Amendment formula an
additional ingredient that clearly frightened Justice Marshall-the re-
quirement of deference.92 Marshall was terribly concerned with
Rhodes's limited concept of federal responsibility for protecting state
inmates' Eighth Amendment rights.9" He feared that the majority
theory would "eviscerate" the federal judicial role in actively reviewing
state prison conditions.94 His experience had shown that deference
to governmental decisions leads to minimization of constitutional
rights. 95 He believed that the majority had taken "far too sanguine a
view of the motivations of state legislators and prison officials."9" Jus-
tice Marshall tried to open the Court's eyes to the political realities.
97
He reminded the majority that in the climate of the day-one of lock
them up and throw away the keys98-it was "unrealistic to expect legis-
lators to care whether the prisons are overcrowded or harmful to in-
mate health."99 He observed that "[t]oo often, state governments
truly are 'insensitive to the requirements of the Eighth Amendment,'
as is evidenced by the repeated need for federal intervention to pro-
tect the rights of inmates." ' Although the Rhodes majority took steps
91. See id.
92. See id. at 898-905.
93. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 375-77 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 375. In Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984),Justice Blackmun also articu-
lated his concern that the Court had embarked on a process of"substitut[ing] the rhetoric
ofjudicial deference for meaningful scrutiny of constitutional claims in the prison setting."
Id. at 593 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Acknowledging that there may sometimes be a dan-
ger of excessive court activism, Justice Blackmun encapsulated his view of the Court's cur-
rent direction by concluding that "careless invocations of 'deference' run the risk of
returning us to the passivity of several decades ago, when the then-prevailing barbarism
and squalor of many prisons were met with a judicial blind eye and a 'hands off' ap-
proach." Id. at 594.
95. See Maclin, supra note 9, at 724 ("General trust in governmental power or defer-
ence to governmental decisions may lead one to minimize constitutional liberties or view
them as tools for efficient law enforcement.").
96. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 376 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
97. See id. at 377.
98. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
99. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 377 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Several southern states have re-
vived a shameful relic of the past-the shackling of inmates on work details. See Senate Must
Cool Chain-Gang Steam, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 20, 1996, at A8, available in 1996 WL
8190580. Spurred by the public's fear of crime, states have resurrected chain gangs, not as
a measure to control crime, but strictly for public show. See id. In the states where the
prison population is overwhelmingly black, the comparison to slavery and the impact on
the African-American community is evident. See id.
100. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 376 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing to the majority opinion in
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 352, wherein the Court stated that in fulfilling their obligation to pro-
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toward abandoning state prisoners, Justice Marshall clearly would
not.1° 1 He alone on the Court was willing to consider the long-term
effects of double celling on inmates, staff, and facilities.'02 Propheti-
cally, when the Supreme Court overturned the lower court's depopu-
lation order, the inmate population grew dramatically."0 ' The new
warden despondently remarked: "We won, but I lost."10 4 The warden
fully appreciated that sometimes nothing fails like success.
IV. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT LIBERTY INTERESTS
In the highly restrictive prison environment, liberties that may be
taken for granted in a free society assume heightened importance." 5
The freedom to pursue religious beliefs, the right to read a book, the
ability to write and receive letters from friends, and the opportunity to
see and embrace family members all provide "a vital link between the
inmate and the outside world.""0 6 These simple freedoms help to cul-
tivate the inmate's mind, providing a respite from "the blankness and
bleakness of his environment," and help to facilitate rehabilitation.10 7
In Wolff v. McDonnell,' an opinion that studied a state prison's
disciplinary practices, the Court asserted that there was to be "no iron
curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this coun-
try." 1' 9 The prisoner, the Court firmly declared, is not totally stripped
of constitutional protections and liberties when he is imprisoned."0
The Wolff majority proclaimed that, although confinement may di-
minish specific constitutional guarantees, including Fourteenth
Amendment freedoms, a "mutual accommodation between institu-
tional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution"
must be struck."' The Wolff Court evaluated the prisoner's claim to
maintain the "good-time credit" he had accrued and rejected the
tect constitutional rights, federal courts "cannot assume that state legislatures and prison
officials are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution").
101. Id. at 377.
102. See id. at 369-75.
103. See PHILLIPJ. COOPER, HARD JUDICIAL CHOICES 266 (1988).
104. Id.
105. See Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 129 (2d Cir. 1978) ("In the close and restrictive
atmosphere of a prison, first amendment guarantees... assume far greater significance."),
rev'd sub nom. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). For a discussion of the Court's decision
in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), see infra notes 234-304 and accompanying text.
106. Wol4szh, 573 F.2d at 129.
107. Id.
108. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
109. Id. at 555-56.
110. Id. at 555.
111. Id. at 556.
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state's assertion that the prisoner's stake in disciplinary procedures is
not a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment." 2 Moreover, the Court found that the protected
liberty interest had its origins in state law; therefore, the prisoner's
investment in his good-time credit "ha[d] real substance and [was]
sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amendment 'liberty."''"
The Wolff Court recognized that minimum procedures were required
by the Due Process Clause "to insure that the state-created right [was]
not arbitrarily abrogated."' 14
The Court in Wolff identified two sources of constitutional liberty
interests protected by due process rights: those derived directly from
the Fourteenth Amendment and those the state creates through its
laws and regulations. 1 5 Specifically, the Wolff Court held that
although the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause does not
contain a liberty right to maintain credit for good behavior, the state
statute mandating reduced sentences for good behavior did.1 16 Once
the state awards these rights, they may not be taken away without
heeding the requirements of due process.1 7
The Court's moderate theory of retained liberty rights derived
directly from the Fourteenth Amendment proved short-lived. For ex-
ample, two years after Wolff in Meachum v. Fano,1 18 the key issue was
whether a state prisoner could be transferred to a substantially more
restrictive prison absent a fact-finding hearing on alleged miscon-
duct.11 9 The Court rejected the concept that "any grievous loss visited
upon a [state prisoner] by the State is sufficient to invoke the proce-
112. Id. at 556-57. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
a state may not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
U.S. CON T. amend. XIV, § 1.
113. Wolff 418 U.S. at 557. The state itself created the right to good-time credit toward
early release from prison and recognized that its deprivation could only be sanctioned by
major misconduct. Id. The prisoner's interest, therefore, had real substance that suffi-
ciently placed him within the pale of Fourteenth Amendment "liberty" and entitled him to
minimum procedural due process. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 556-57.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
119. Id. at 216. The transfers occurred after a period of unrest at the Massachusetts
Correctional Institution at Norfolk when several fires erupted, which officials suspected
had been set by the inmates. Id. at 216-17. The corrections authorities, after reviewing the
classification board's recommendations, transferred six inmates to the Walpole and
Bridgewater facilities, where living conditions were "substantially more adverse" than at
Norfolk. Fano v. Meachum, 387 F. Supp. 664, 666-67 (D. Mass. 1975), af'd, 520 F.2d 374
(1st Cir. 1975) (2-1 decision), rev'd, Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
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dural protections of the Due Process Clause."' 20 The prisoner's con-
viction, the Court held, "sufficiently extinguished" his liberty,
permitting the state to confine him in any of its prisons. 2 The state
law conferred no right on the inmate to remain in the prison to which
he was initially confined, and whatever expectation he may have had
was "too ephemeral and insubstantial to trigger procedural due pro-
cess protections."12 2 In short, Wolffs limited liberty theory did not ap-
ply to prison transfers, even those sparked by alleged misconduct. 21
Therefore, prison officials retained unfettered discretion to transfer
prisoners for any reason or, more draconian, for no reason at all.'
24
Several years later, in Hewitt v. Helms,125 the Court once again
commented on its highly restrictive liberty theory. The state inmate,
Helms, was believed to have participated in a riot and was conse-
quently confined to a segregation unit pending investigation into his
role in the uprising.' 26 In evaluating his claim to remain in a general
population cell, the Court rejected the theory that this was a right
protected by the Due Process Clause.' 27 The Court characterized
Helms's transfer from the general population cell to the more restric-
tive administrative segregation quarters as the sort of confinement in-
mates should reasonably anticipate receiving at some point in their
incarceration.
28
The Court has continually declined to delineate the hierarchy of
significant liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause, consistently refusing to recognize anything more
than the most basic liberty interests.129 In Vitek v. Jones, 3' the Court
recognized one such interest, concluding that a state prisoner pos-
sesses a significant Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in avoiding
involuntary transfer to a state mental institution for treatment of a
120. Meachur, 427 U.S. at 224. For a comprehensive study of the positivist theory of
.property" and "liberty," see Susan N. Herman, The New Liberty: The Procedural Due Process
Rights of Prisoners and Others Under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 482 (1984).
121. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224.
122. Id. at 228.
123. Id. at 225-26.
124. Id. at 228. The Court distinguished Wolff in that "[t]he liberty interest protected in
Wolff had its roots in state law," and the minimum procedures required there were to
protect a state-created right. Id. at 226. In Meachuz, "[t]he predicate for invoking the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment as construed and applied in Wolff v. McDonnell is
totally nonexistent." Id. at 227.
125. 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
126. Id. at 463-64.
127. Id. at 467.
128. Id. at 468.
129. See id. at 467.
130. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
163
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mental disease."' l The stigma associated with involuntary transfer to a
mental hospital, coupled with "mandatory behavior modification as a
treatment for mental illness," was meaningfully different from the
punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of a
crime."12 Likewise, in Washington v. Harper,3' the Court concluded
that, independent of any regulation, an inmate had a significant lib-
erty interest in being protected from the unwanted administration of
psychotropic drugs.13 4 The Court's treatment of mentally disturbed
state prisoners is unique, however, because in virtually all other cir-
cumstances, the states' interests in unhindered control of their pris-
ons has invariably prevailed.1
3 5
The Court's methodology was now clear: except for the most ba-
sic of liberty interests, a prisoner would not gain any substantive pro-
tection from the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
Regarding state regulations, the Court ceased to examine the nature
of the liberty lost, wrestling only with the language of the relevant
statutes to determine if there was a state-created substantive liberty
interest. 3 16 The Court found that a state may create enforceable lib-
erty interests in the prison setting by using "'explicitly mandatory
[statutory] language"' limiting correctional officials' discretion. 13 7
The Court's continued focus on the "mechanical dichotomy" between
state regulations that were mandatory and those that were merely dis-
cretionary encouraged prisoners to scrutinize state regulations in
search of mandatory language on which to base their entitlement
131. Id. at 488.
132. Id. at 494.
133. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
134. Id. at 221-22. However, the Court held that, "given the requirements of the prison
environment, the Due Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate who has a
serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to
himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate's medical interest." Id at 227. Fur-
thermore, the Special Offender Center's policy was "neither arbitrary nor erroneous" and
satisfied the procedural protections required by the Due Process Clause. Id. at 228. This
was so even though the decision to medicate an inmate against his will was made at a
hearing by medical professionals, rather than by a judge. Id. at 228-35.
135. See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2299 (1995) ("[F]ederal courts ought to
afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile
environment.") (citations omitted); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470 (1983) (stating that
prison operations have "traditionally been entrusted to the expertise of prison officials")
(citation omitted); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) (finding that subjecting all
deprivations to judicial review would invade the "business of prison administrators").
136. In Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 459-63 (1989),Jus-
tice Blackmun summarized the Court's history of prisoners' liberties protected by the Due
Process Clause. For a discussion of Thompson, see infra notes 162-178 and accompanying
text.
137. Thompson, 490 U.S. at 463 (quoting Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 472).
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claims. 138 For states interested in more uniform treatment, this cre-
ated a disincentive to codify their prison management procedures.
The net effect was to inject federal courts into the micro-management
of prisons, thereby upsetting the balance between appropriate defer-
ence to the expertise of prison administrators and the effectiveness of
judicial oversight.1 " 9
Weary of the number of trivial claims this perfunctory approach
encouraged and showing a lack of sympathy for the prisoners' plight,
the Court abandoned its language-based analysis in Sandin v. Con-
ner," 0 thereby increasing the burden upon prisoners challenging
prison administration actions."' Although the Court continued to ac-
knowledge that due process protection for liberty interests may spring
from two sources, it narrowed the category of state-created interests:
[T] hese interests will be generally limited to freedom from
restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an
unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due
Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical
and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life.14
Because the prisoners' disciplinary segregations in Conner were, with
"insignificant exceptions," the same as those imposed on inmates
placed in discretionary confinement for administrative or protective
reasons, they were not unusual, significant deprivations that would sat-
isfy the standard for any state-created liberty interest. 143
As expected, Justice Marshall's view of protected liberty was very
different from that of the Court majorities. Although he did not write
in the early prison liberty interest case of Meachum,14" he joined Jus-
tice Stevens's dissent.' 45 For Stevens and Marshall, it was self-evident
that the source of liberty protected by the Constitution was natural
law: "[A] 11 men were endowed by their Creator with liberty as one of
the cardinal unalienable rights. It is that basic freedom which the
Due Process Clause protects, rather than the particular rights or privi-
138. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2298-99.
139. See id. at 2299.
140. 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995).
141. Id. at 2300.
142. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 2301.
144. Justice Marshall's views regarding liberty interests are expressed in Olim v.
Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 251-59 (1983) (Marshall,J., dissenting). See infra notes 151-161
and accompanying text.
145. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 229 (1976) (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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leges conferred by specific laws or regulations." 4 6 For the dissenting
Justices, it "demean[ed] the concept of liberty itself-to ascribe to [it]
nothing more than a protection of an interest that the State has cre-
ated through its own [laws or] prison regulations."' 147 To them, it was
clear that "the inmate retains an unalienable interest in liberty-at the
very minimum the right to be treated with dignity-which the Consti-
tution may never ignore. " "' Trying to identify the residuum of liberty
an inmate retains in the prison environment was understandably a dif-
ficult task. The dissenters were convinced, however, that at a mini-
mum a prisoner "has a protected right to pursue his limited
rehabilitative goals" and "to maintain whatever attributes of dignity"
he can as an inmate in a "tightly controlled society. '"49 Certainly, Jus-
tice Stevens also reflected Justice Marshall's view when he explained
that if an inmate's liberty was "no greater than the State chooses to
allow, he is really little more than the slave described in the 19th cen-
tury cases."
150
More direct insight into Justice Marshall's concept of prisoners'
liberty rights can be found in his dissent in Olim v. Wakinekona.i1i Ap-
plying the principles developed in Meachum,15' a majority of the Court
decided that the transfer of a prisoner from a state prison in Hawaii to
one in California implicated no Fourteenth Amendment liberty inter-
est. 5 Justice Marshall did not agree with the majority that the in-
mate's liberty interest was merely a function of the state's
beneficence.154 In his calculus, it was the Fourteenth Amendment lib-
erty right itself, not the language of Hawaii's regulations, that was the
source of the protection due Wakinekona.155 In Marshall's estima-
tion, to determine if a change in conditions of imprisonment impli-
cates an inmate's liberty interest, "the relevant question is whether the
change constitutes a sufficiently 'grievous loss' to trigger the protec-
146. Id. at 230.
147. Id. at 233.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 234.
150. Id. at 233.
151. 461 U.S. 238, 251 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
152. See supra notes 118-124 and accompanying text.
153. Olim, 461 U.S. at 248-49 (citing Meachum, 427 U.S. at 226, 228).
154. Id. at 251 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
155. Id. In Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995), Justice Ginsburg echoed Justice
Marshall's philosophy, writing: "I see the Due Process Clause itself, not Hawaii's prison
code, as the wellspring of the protection due Conner." Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2203 (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting).
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tion of due process.15 6 The answer depends in part on a comparison
of 'the treatment of the particular prisoner with the customary, habit-
ual treatment of the population of the prison as a whole.' 1 7 Justice
Marshall would not "agree that a State may transfer its prisoners at
will, to any place, for any reason, without ever implicating any interest
in liberty protected by the Due Process Clause."'15
One might ask why these rights, with their concomitant proce-
dural safeguards, were so important to Justice Marshall. Plainly, he
could once again imagine what a person feels under the circum-
stances. 159 He chronicled the range of possible detrimental effects on
the transferred prisoner:
For an indeterminate period of time, possibly the rest of his
life, nearly 2,500 miles of ocean will separate him from his
family and friends. As a practical matter, Wakinekona may
be entirely cut off from his only contacts with the outside
world, just as if he had been imprisoned in an institution
which prohibited visits by outsiders. Surely the isolation im-
posed on him by the transfer is far more drastic than that
which normally accompanies imprisonment. 6 °
Marshall was keenly aware that the inmate, Wakinekona, had "in ef-
fect been banished from his home, a punishment historically consid-
ered to be 'among the severest.'
1 61
Justice Marshall revisited the issue of prisoners' liberty rights in
Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson,162 a decision that again
highlighted the Court's diverse perspectives on the liberty protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment. 65 The majority's analysis began by
asserting that it could not seriously be contended that an inmate has
unfettered visitation privileges guaranteed by the Constitution; there-
fore, "[t]he denial of prison access to a particular visitor 'is well within
the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sen-
156. Olim, 461 U.S. at 252 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Vitek v.
Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980)).
157. Id. (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 486 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
158. Id. at 254. Justice Marshall also could not agree with the majority's conclusion that
Hawaii's prison regulation did not create a liberty interest. Id. at 254-59. He concluded
that Hawaii's prison classification regulations were cast in mandatory language taking away
prison officials' unfettered discretion to transfer inmates. Id. at 255-56.
159. See id. at 252-53.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 252 (footnote omitted) (quoting JONATHAN ELLIOT, 4 THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 555 (1836)
(statement of James Madison)).
162. 490 U.S. 454 (1989).
163. See generally id.
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tence."'' 6 Furthermore, the Court found that the state regulation at
issue lacked the "relevant mandatory language" necessary to establish
a state-created liberty interest entitled to due process protections.16 5
The regulation provided that "[v] isitors may be excluded if they fall
within one of the described categories, but they need not be. Nor
need visitors fall within one of the described categories in order to be
excluded." 66 Stated more precisely, "the regulations are not worded
in such a way that an inmate could reasonably expect to enforce them
against the prison officials."167
Thompson raised fundamental issues relevant to general prison ad-
ministration. Justice Marshall was alarmed, not merely by the result,
but also by the majority's reasoning in Thompson, which exhibited the
Court's willingness to accede to correctional authority, as well as its
dispassion for inmates' basic human needs. 168  Thompson demon-
strated the Court's intention to subordinate prisoners' interests to the
warden's unsupervised power to control his jail.169 For Justice Mar-
shall, the majority's callous acquiescence to the warden's uncontrolled
power to deny visitation belied the Court's continuous proclamation
that "[p]rison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates
from the protections of the Constitution."170
In his Thompson dissent, Justice Marshall reiterated his theory that
when prison officials change the conditions of a prisoner's confine-
ment, the courts must inquire into whether the prisoner has suffered
"'a sufficiently "grievous loss" to trigger the protection of due pro-
cess."' 1 7 1 For him, the answer required not only an assessment of the
gravity of the change, but also a determination of whether the pris-
oner had been arbitrarily singled out for disparate treatment.172 It
was no surprise thatJustice Marshall agreed with those authorities pro-
claiming that visitation is so important to the reintegration of the in-
mate into society that its denial is a grievous loss implicating a
164. Id. at 461 (citation omitted) (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983)).
165. Id. at 464.
166. Id. (citation omitted).
167. Id. at 465 (footnote omitted).
168. Id. at 466 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 467 ("In theory [a prisoner] retains some minimal interest in liberty pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause, but in practice this interest crystallizes only on those
infrequent occasions when a majority of the Court happens to say so.") (footnote omitted).
170. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
171. Thompson, 490 U.S. at 467 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Olim v. Wakinekona,
461 U.S. 238, 252 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480,
488 (1980) (plurality opinion))).
172. Id.
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prisoner's retained liberty interest.' 71 Without family visits, an inmate
"may be entirely cut off from his only contacts with the outside
world."17
4
Thompson is significant because it gave the warden unbridled dis-
cretion over the prisoner's basic human need to see his family and
friends. 175 For Justice Marshall, that was devastating; he could not ac-
cept such a "parsimonious reading of the Due Process Clause."1 76 It
was not unfettered visitation that he sought to protect, but rather the
recognition that visitation is important enough to warrant basic proce-
dural protections from arbitrary action.177 With the voice of reason,
Justice Marshall reminded the Court: "One need hardly be cynical
about prison administrators to recognize that the distinct possibility of
[retaliation] calls for a modicum of procedural protections to guard
against such behavior."1 7
8
V. DISTRUST OF PRISON AUTHORITIES' EXERCISE OF POWER:
PROTECTING PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
Prior to the Supreme Court's involvement in prison conditions,
state corrections officials were able to take away good-time credits af-
ter "serious misconduct" was shown in a nonadversarial hearing.179
After examining a state prison disciplinary proceeding that took place
in a "closed, tightly controlled environment,"180 the Court in Wolff v.
McDonnell1  sought to design a structure that would accord proce-
dural fairness to inmates.' 82 The Wolff Court determined that before
state prisoners could lose good-time credits, minimum procedural
safeguards required that they receive advance written notice of the
alleged violations, together with a written statement by the fact finders
as to their findings, including reasons for the disciplinary action
173. Id. at 468 n.4.
174. Olim, 461 U.S. at 253 (Marshall,J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also found that the
Commonwealth's visitation regulations and policies "'created'" a liberty interest. Thomp-
son, 490 U.S. at 470 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
175. Thompson, 490 U.S. at 466 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 476.
177. Id. at 475. Cf Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). The Director of the Califor-
nia Department of Corrections determined that personal visits "aid in the rehabilitation of
the inmate while not compromising the other legitimate objectives of the corrections sys-
tem." Id. at 825.
178. Thompson, 490 U.S. at 470 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
179. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 546, 548-52 n.8 (1974). For a discussion of Wolff
see supra notes 108-117 and accompanying text.
180. Woff 418 U.S. at 561.
181. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
182. Id. at 563-72.
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taken.1 8 3 Furthermore, prisoners were to be permitted to call wit-
nesses and to present documentary evidence in their defense when
not unduly hazardous to institutional safety.' 84
Wolff s "mutual accommodation" model did not, however, em-
brace the rights to confrontation, cross-examination, or the appoint-
ment of counsel.' 5 These procedural rights were viewed as
presenting a potential danger to institutional goals and were not per-
ceived as requiring constitutional protection in the prison setting.'8 6
The Court agreed with the State that it would not be propitious to
encase "disciplinary procedures in an inflexible constitutional strait-
jacket" resembling proceedings typical of a criminal trial.18 7 Compel-
ling corrections officials to provide these procedures, the Court
reasoned, would most likely "raise the level of confrontation between
staff and inmate," thereby undermining the "utilization of the discipli-
nary process as a tool to advance the rehabilitative goals of the institu-
tion." "' The Court remarked that as correctional goals evolve, the
balance of interests may be altered.' 8 9 However, because security dan-
gers were involved, and "prison practices are diverse and somewhat
experimental," the better practice was to leave these matters to the
sound discretion of the state corrections officials.190
Justice Marshall adamantly disagreed with the majority in Wolff
seeing no justification for its refusal to accord prisoners the basic pro-
cedural safeguards found to be among the minimum requirements of
due process.' 9 ' At the least, he would extend to prisoners those mini-
mum requirements of due process that the Court required in parole
revocation hearings.'9 2 This would include the right to call witnesses
and present documentary evidence, as well as the right to confront
183. Id. at 563.
184. Id. at 566.
185. Id. at 567, 570.
186. Id. at 567-68, 570.
187. Id. at 563.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 568.
190. Id. at 569.
191. Id. at 580-81 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 594-98. The prisoners in Wolff argued for the same protections required in
parole and probation revocation hearings included in Mornssey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpeli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). Wolff, 418 U.S. at 559-61. In Morrissey,
the Court required that procedural safeguards for parole revocation include:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the pa-
rolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to pres-
ent witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good
cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a "neutral and detached" hearing body
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and cross-examine adverse witnesses.1 93 He reminded the majority
that without these basic protections, an inmate facing disciplinary pro-
ceedings was "afforded no means to challenge the word of his accus-
ers." 194 Justice Marshall fervently disagreed with the majority that
these rights were not important, 195 especially when measured against
"the seriousness of the deprivation involved."' 96 For him, these proce-
dures were necessary "to reveal mistakes of identity, faulty percep-
tions, or cloudy memories, [and to prevent] abuse of the disciplinary
process by 'persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance,
prejudice, or jealousy.' 197 Moreover, providing for basic procedural
requirements would enhance the rehabilitative process by avoiding re-
actions of arbitrariness and the feeling among inmates that they were
being treated unfairly.'98
The Wolff Court had taken a tentative step in the direction of
prison reform, acknowledging that future events may "require further
consideration and reflection."199 Nevertheless, the decision sent con-
flicting messages. By refusing to accept established prison proce-
dures, the Court discarded the hands-off doctrine,200 but resolved that
when security dangers are involved, respect for the sound discretion
of state officials was to play a decisive role.2" 1
The Wolff opinion did not evaluate the best way to accommodate
the inmate's right to call witnesses. The deference accorded prison
officials left the inmate with no remedy against a prison board intent
on arresting rights in the name of" 'institutional safety.""'2 2 The right
to call witnesses and present documentary evidence appeared unen-
forceable when left to the unchecked discretion of prison officials. 2°3
A requirement by the Court that a disciplinary board provide, on the
record, a contemporaneous, written explanation of its reasons for ex-
cluding an inmate's witness would go far toward guaranteeing that the
... ; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on
and reasons for revoking parole.
Mornssey, 408 U.S. at 489. In Gagnon, the Court applied the Monissey standards to proba-
tion revocation hearings and further held that due process requires the appointment of
counsel for these hearings when it is fundamentally necessary. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 783-91.
193. Wolff 418 U.S. at 581-82 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 582.
195. Id. at 584.
196. Id. at 585.
197. Id. at 585-86 (quoting Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959)).
198. Id.
199. Woff 418 U.S. at 572.
200. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
201. Wolff 418 U.S. at 569.
202. Id. at 593 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 597-98.
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board's exclusion of a witness was based on permissible factors. When
this option was presented in Ponte v. Real,2°4 however, the majority
once again chose Wolff s ambiguous correctional goal of "swift disci-
pline. ' 20 5 The Real Court did not compel prison officials to state as
part of the administrative record their reason for excluding an in-
mate's witness, but gave prison officials the choice to do so later by
testimony in court.206
In his Real dissent, Justice Marshall reminded the majority that, as
even the Court acknowledged, the combination of sealed files and in
camera review would adequately protect its primary concern for institu-
tional safety.20 7 The Justice speculated that the Court would also ac-
knowledge, if pushed, that because Wolff already required a written
statement by the fact finders as to the evidence relied on and reasons
for the disciplinary actions, the "twinkling of an eye that it would take
for a board to [also] offer brief, contemporaneous reasons for refus-
ing to hear witnesses would hardly interfere with any valid correc-
tional goals. °2 08 Marshall knew that by permitting postponement of a
reasonable explanation, Real left the inmates' constitutional right to
present witnesses "dangling in the wind. 20 9
For the majority in Real, the primary business of corrections is
supervision of inmates-a responsibility the Justices were not inter-
ested in overseeing.210 Whereas the majority had shown little interest
in compromising, 211 Justice Marshall was able to see the disciplinary
hearings from the inmate's point of view: to the inmate they were
pretend trials-proving guilt was make-believe. 12
204. 471 U.S. 491 (1985).
205. Id. at 495.
206. Id. at 497.
207. Id. at 513 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 517.
209. Id. at 522.
210. Rea, 471 U.S. at 498-99.
211. The majority did, however, recognize the importance of certain procedural
safeguards:
The requirement that contemporaneous reasons for denying witnesses and evi-
dence be given admittedly has some appeal, and it may commend itself to prison
officials as a matter of choice: recollections of the event will be fresher at the
moment, and it seems a more lawyerlike way to do things. But the primary busi-
ness of prisons is the supervision of inmates, and it may well be that those charged
with this responsibility feel that the additional administrative burdens which
would be occasioned by such a requirement detract from the ability to perform
the principal mission of the institution.
Id. at 497-98 (footnote omitted).
212. See KATHRYN W. BURKHART, WOMEN IN PRISON 147 (1973).
[I]fI were to describe how [the disciplinary hearings] seem to a stranger, I would
call them "pretend trials"-with the concept of "proving" guilt only make-be-
172 [VOL. 56:149
1997] THE PRISON JURISPRUDENCE OF THURGOOD MARSHALL 173
Justice Marshall's generous reading of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment stands in sharp contrast to his colleagues'
sparse, restrictive reading. To him, constitutional liberties embody
values that far transcend concerns for correctional efficiency. He ad-
vocated fair treatment for the vulnerable, believing that this is what
makes our country great. Justice Marshall's view of procedural fair-
ness epitomizes what the Constitution and the Supreme Court could
potentially mean to politically weak members of society.
VI. JUSTICE MARSHALL'S PIVOTAL ROLE IN THE PRISON REFORM
MOVEMENT: PROTECTING THE HUMAN SPIRIT
There is little question that the government and a majority of the
Court have adopted a retributivist philosophy of punishment." 3 The
Supreme Court has found no constitutional mandate for "comfortable
prisons,"214 imploring the lower federal courts to avoid becoming en-
snared in the perplexing, sociological problem of how best to run
prisons.213 As poetically advocated by Justice Rehnquist, "nobody
promised them a rose garden."2 6
Although there is a basic intuitive appeal for harsh prison treat-
ment, for Justice Marshall it made absolutely no sense to confine a
person under conditions that may increase the likelihood of recidi-
vism.2 17 Throughout his career, he advocated a society that highly val-
ued human dignity. For the twenty-four years he sat on the Court, he
served as its conscience on prison reform.2 18 In the prison setting,
Justice Marshall set his goal: to provide for the human qualities of
inmates. The Justice's strong moral sensitivity was repulsed by a dem-
ocratic society that maintains a prison system which cages inmates like
animals, stacks them like chattel in a warehouse, and then expects
lieve.... [T]he process is not impartial, nor is guilt or innocence the issue. Guilt
is an a priori assumption.
Id.
213. See Samuel H. Pillsbury, Note, Creatures, Persons, and Prisoners: Evaluating Prison Con-
ditions Under the Eighth Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1099, 1128 (1982) (analyzing the
Court's opinion in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981)).
214. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349.
215. See id. at 352.
216. Atiyeh v. Capps, 449 U.S. 1312, 1315-16 (1981) (granting a stay of a trial court
order requiring population reduction in an Oregon prison pending a decision in Rhodes).
217. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 370 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Holt v. Sarver, 309 F.
Supp. 362, 379 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (mem.) (arguing that rehabilitative programs prevent
recidivism), aff'd, 442 F2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
218. See generally Resolutions, supra note 2 (hailing Marshall as a defender of civil rights).
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that they emerge as decent, law-abiding citizens." 9 Marshall believed
that a convicted person's loss of liberty was the sole punishment per-
mitted; any additional restraints or deprivations in the normal struc-
ture of prison life should be subject to judicial scrutiny.2
Justice Marshall strove to develop a prison jurisprudence that pre-
served the idealistic concepts of dignity, humanity, and decency.221
He viewed the Constitution as protecting indispensable human values
from government interference, even in the face of the special need
for efficient prison administration.222 He especially could not con-
done blind deference to governmental authority.223 This was the phi-
losophy he embraced. It certainly was not "anti-corrections";224 it is
what he understood the Constitution to mean.
Justice Marshall emphasized that "the crucial task is not so much
to define our rights and liberties, but to establish institutions which
can make the principles embodied in our Constitution meaningful in
the lives of ordinary citizens." 225 He sought to apply this jurispru-
dence to prisoners confined to penitentiaries. Through his opinions,
he strove to provide prisoners with a safe and sanitary environment,
free from conditions that may unnecessarily cause pain or the risk of
physical or mental deterioration. 226
A. Securing the Right to Medical Treatment
Marshall recognized that total control of prisoners denies them
any opportunity to care for themselves, thereby obligating the govern-
ment to provide them with their basic necessities. On the unique oc-
casion of Estelle v. Gamble,2 7 when he was assigned to write a majority
219. See Pillsbury, supra note 213, at 1128 n.191 (citing Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F.
Supp. 20, 38 (M.D. Fla. 1975), affd, 525 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 325
(1977)).
220. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 568 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (allowing
deference to jail officials on what regulations constitute punishment usurps a traditional
judicial function).
221. See id. at 576-77 (stating that strip searches violate "personal dignity and common
decency").
222. See id. at 579 ("Such unthinking deference to administrative convenience cannot be
justified where the interests at stake are those of presumptively innocent individuals, many
of whose only proven offense is the inability to afford bail.").
223. See id.
224. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
225. Thurgood Marshall, Group Action in the Pursuit ofJustice, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 661, 662
(1969).
226. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 375 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(stating that overcrowding and double ceiling "cause deterioration in [prisoners'] mental
and physical health").
227. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
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prison conditions opinion, Marshall seized the opportunity, acknowl-
edging for the first time that the Eighth Amendment applies to seri-
ous deprivations of liberty that may occur in prison. 2 8 In Estelle,
Justice Marshall validated the elementary principle that the govern-
ment has an "obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is
punishing by incarceration. An inmate must rely on prison authori-
ties to treat his medical needs," if these needs are to be met.229
Justice Marshall emphasized, however, that medical decisions
such as treatment choices are beyond the scope of the Constitution,
making it clear that the Eighth Amendment was not to be trans-
formed into a tort remedy; it was not medical malpractice that was to
be contained.23 ° The Eighth Amendment would not protect prison-
ers against accidental or unintentional mistreatment, but would pro-
tect them from inadequate responses to their serious medical
needs.23 ' Failure to do so, Marshall recognized, could result in physi-
cal torture, death, or at a minimum, pain and suffering without peno-
logical purpose.232 Marshall strove to capture the constitutional
standard by holding that the Eighth Amendment bans treatment that
shows "deliberate indifference" to prisoners' severe medical needs.2 3
228. Id. at 101-06.
229. Id. at 103.
230. Id. at 104-06.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 103.
233. Id. at 104. In Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991), a sharply divided Court, led by
Justice Scalia writing for the five-member majority, seized on the "deliberate indifference"
wording and noted that "'[t]he infliction of punishment is a deliberate act intended to
chastise or deter.'" Id. at 300 (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir.
1985)). Justice Scalia reasoned that if the pain inflicted by the prison conditions was "not
formally meted out as punishment by the statute or the sentencing judge," then some
mental element must be attributed to the prison officials responsible for the care of the
inmate in order for it to be prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Id. (emphasis added).
Reviewing past Eighth Amendment challenges to prison deprivations, Justice Scalia
divined both an "objective component... (Was the deprivation sufficiently serious?)" and
a "subjective component (Did the officials act with a sufficiently culpable state of mind?)."
Id. at 298. Specifically, inmates challenging serious constitutional deprivations in confine-
ment must show that prison officials behaved in a wanton manner, for it is only then that
"deliberate indifference" to the challenged conditions can amount to a constitutional vio-
lation. Id. at 303.
Justice Scalia also placed an additional obstacle in the path of prison reform. He
clearly recognized that the "totality of conditions" approach advocated by the Court in
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981), made possible very intrusive remedies. Wilson, 501
U.S. at 298. He wanted to ensure that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause not be
used as an easy tool for prison reform. Id. What Rhodes meant, wrote Scalia, was that:
"Some conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation 'in combi-
nation' when each would not do so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing
effect ... for example, a low cell temperature at night combined with a failure to issue
blankets." Id. at 304. "Nothing so amorphous as 'overall conditions' can rise to the level of
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B. Impact of Prison Regulations on Pretrial Detainees:
Practices That Are an Affront to Dignity
The problems of operating a correctional facility are enormous,
and the Court believed it must give prison administrators a wide berth
to adopt and execute policies needed to preserve internal order. In
Bell v. Wolfish,2"4 the Court analyzed the "special status" of pretrial de-
tainees, identifying a special Fourteenth Amendment right not to be
punished prior to being adjudged guilty. 235 The Court noted, how-
ever, that not every restriction imposed during this period of pretrial
detention "amounts to 'punishment' in the constitutional sense."
2 36
In ascertaining whether it was punishment, the Wolfish Court found
the subjective intent of prison officials to be decisive. 237 Absent a
showing of an express intent to punish on the part of the detention
officials, the determination of whether the particular restriction
amounts to punishment turns on whether it is reasonably related to a
legitimate governmental objective and not excessive in relation to that
purpose.23 8
Although detainees are entitled to at least those constitutional
rights retained by convicted persons, all restrictions, even those that
impinge upon a specific constitutional guarantee, must be evaluated
cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation of a single human need exists
.... " Id. at 305. For a prisoner to succeed on his Eighth Amendment claim,Justice Scalia
declared, he must show a deprivation of an "identifiable human need such as food,
warmth, or exercise." Id. at 304. There was to be no "seamless web" of prison conditions
for Eighth Amendment purposes. Id. at 305.
For a more comprehensive discussion of Wilson see, Gutterman, supra note 22, at 385-
99.
234. 441 U.S. 520 (1979); see supra note 54.
235. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 535. Although some of the individuals housed in the Metropol-
itan Correction Center (MCC) were convicted criminals, the facility was designed for, and
primarily housed, pretrial detainees. Id. at 524.
236. Id. at 537.
237. Id. at 537-38. The Court applied the punishment test established in Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963):
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has
historically been regarded as punishment, whether it comes into play only on a
finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of pun-
ishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is
already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and may often point
in differing directions.
Wolish, 441 U.S. at 537-38 (quoting Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69).
238. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 538-39. "Conversely, if a restriction or condition is not reason-
ably related to a legitimate goal-if it is arbitrary or purposeless-a court permissibly may
infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not constitution-
ally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees." Id. at 539.
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in light of the central objective of prison administration-safeguard-
ing institutional security.2" 9 "A detainee simply does not possess the
full range of freedoms of an unincarcerated individual."24 ° With this
principle firmly established, the Court concluded that pretrial detain-
ees pose similar security risks as convicted inmates.241 While prior de-
cisions focused on sentenced prisoners, the "principle of deference"
was not dependent on this fact.24 2 The Court concluded that the
"publishers-only" rule, prohibiting receipt of hardback books not
mailed directly from the publisher, did not violate the First Amend-
ment 243 because it reduced the chances that contraband would enter
the prison.2 "4 This limited restriction was "a rational response by
prison officials to an obvious security problem." 45 Limitations on re-
ceipt of packages from outside the facility containing food or personal
property were held not to violate due process because of the adminis-
trative inconvenience of storing food and the serious security
problems that arise from the introduction of such packages into the
institution.246 The unannounced "shakedown" searches of inmates'
living areas in their absence did not violate the Fourth Amendment247
and were permitted as facilitating "the safe and effective performance
of the search." 48 Finally, the practice that troubled the Court most,
visual body cavity searches after contact visits, 249 was upheld as reason-
239. Id. at 545-47.
240. Id. at 546.
241. Id. at 546 n.28.
242. Id. at 547 n.29.
243. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONsr. amend. 1.
244. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 550-51.
245. Id. at 550.
246. Id. at 553.
247. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
248. Wo~flsh, 441 U.S. at 557. The Court assumed, arguendo, that a pretrial detainee
retained a diminished expectation of privacy after commitment to a custodial facility. Id.
Subsequently, in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), the Supreme Court held that a
prisoner has no expectation of privacy in his prison cell entitling him to the protection of
the Fourth Amendment. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 525-26.
249. See infra notes 278-304 and accompanying text.
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able to deter the smuggling of weapons, drugs, and other contraband
into the institution.
2 50
Notwithstanding the impression created by the majority, Justice
Marshall was acutely aware that the detainees had not been convicted
of a crime and that their detention served only the more limited regu-
latory purpose of assuring their presence at trial. 25' The prison regu-
lations, however, were not limited to convicted individuals or even to
pretrial detainees shown to be particularly dangerous; rather, they ap-
plied indiscriminately to all persons housed at the detention
facility.252
The enforcement of these rules, Justice Marshall concluded, was
a clear affront to the detainees' dignity as human beings.255 The
rights involved were among those specifically protected by the Consti-
tution, underscoring their societal importance. 54 Prohibiting a de-
tainee from receiving books and packages from his family and friends
conveys to him that he is untrustworthy.255 Searching, in his absence,
his private possessions offends not merely his privacy interests, but
also his interest in "minimal dignity."256 Because the detainees are
"presumptively innocent and many are confined solely because they
cannot afford bail,"2 57 the punishment model cut too close to the core
of their due process guarantees.258 The Court's punishment test, Jus-
tice Marshall argued, was adverse to a closer scrutiny of the depriva-
tions imposed; it avoided examining less restrictive practices adopted
by other detention facilities, as well as the recommendations of profes-
sional organizations.259 He preferred to have the impact of confine-
ment regulations, not the intent behind them, as the focal point of
250. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 558-59.
251. See id. at 569 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 568 ("Reasoning that security considerations in jails are little different than in
prisons, the Court concludes that cases requiring substantial deference to prison adminis-
trators' determinations on security-related issues are equally applicable in the present con-
text.") (citation omitted). As to the convicted criminals housed at MCC, their detention
may serve a legitimate punitive goal; Justice Marshall concluded the same was not true of
the detainees whose rights were addressed in Wolfish. Id.
253. Id. at 569 (stating that pretrial detention "is essentially indistinguishable from pun-
ishment") (footnote omitted).
254. Id. at 571-79.
255. Id. at 593 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
256. United States ex reL Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affid in
part, rev'd in part sub nom. Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
257. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 563 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
258. Id. at 568.
259. Id. at 565.
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constitutional analyses.26 ° By seeking "merely to sanitize official mo-
tives and prohibit irrational behavior," the Court's reformulated pun-
ishment test lacked any real content.261 Justice Marshall was not an
adherent in the Court's decision to designate the detention officials'
intent as the critical factor in determining the constitutionality of the
regulations.262 He accused the majority of being "unrealistic in the
extreme," by adopting a "toothless standard."265 Almost any restric-
tion can be shown to have some rational relationship to institutional
security or to the all-embracing "effective management of the deten-
tion facility."2 ' Because the Court apparently was not willing to look
behind any justification that was based on security,265 the burden on
detainees to establish punitive intent will almost always be
insurmountable.
Justice Marshall would have rather had the majority consider the
loss to the detainee: he is involuntarily confined and deprived of his
freedom to be with his family, told when to eat and sleep, and divested
of all the other benefits of normal life. 6 When his interests are
placed next to the corrections staff s concern for administrative con-
venience, the latter pales in comparison. Justice Marshall's response
to the Wolfish regulations was straightforward: to impose additional
deprivations merits a balancing test requiring jail administrators to
carry a heavier burden ofjustification the greater the intrusion on the
detainee.26 7 The government must endure a more rigorous test than
the rational basis standard mandates.268 Where the regulation impli-
cates fundamentally important interests, corrections personnel must
demonstrate that the rule "serves a compelling necessity of jail
administration."2 6
9
Applying this standard, Justice Marshall found the limitation on
the receipt of hardback books to be unwarranted. 2 0 The institution
offered no reasons why it could not limit the number of hardback
books received or use electronic devices and fluoroscopes to detect
260. Id. at 563-64. "By its terms, the Due Process Clause focuses on the nature of the
deprivations, not on the persons inflicting them." Id. at 567.
261. Id. at 565.
262. Id. at 565-67.
263. Id. at 565, 567.
264. Id. at 567 (construing the majority opinion in Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 540).
265. Wofish, 441 U.S. at 540.
266. Id. at 569 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482
(1972)).
267. Id. at 569-70.
268. Id. at 570.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 574.
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contraband instead of requiring inmates to buy directly from publish-
ers or stores. v1 Additionally, the record did not establish that
searches of detainees' cells, in their absence, were substantially neces-
sary to jail administration. 2  Because they may invite disrespect for
the detainees' few possessions, as well as generate fear that the guards
may steal personal property or plant contraband, the inmates' inter-
ests were significant enough to warrant permitting them to observe
searches of their cells.273 Justice Marshall also agreed with the lower
courts that the correctional center's restriction against the receipt of
packages from outside the facility "swept too broadly."2 74 He would
order detention facilities to formulate a more suitable alternative.275
C. Prohibiting Practices That Demoralize and Degrade the Inmate
Although prison officials sometimes deliberately use prison regu-
lations and practices to punish misbehavior, for the most part they
evince an indifference toward the prisoner's plight. Their primary in-
terest is in maintaining exclusive authority to operate their prisons as
they see fit.2 76 Justice Marshall knew that the Constitution required
the Court, not the warden, to balance the preservation of human dig-
nity against correctional needs. 77
Nowhere are dignity concerns more acutely implicated than in
the area of bodily integrity. Intrusive body searches generate feelings
of "degradation" and "terror."278 Visual body cavity examinations en-
gender fear in inmates of physical and sexual abuse by prison
1
271. Id. As Marshall noted, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that
"'other institutions have not recorded untoward experiences with far less restrictive rules.'"
Id. (citing Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 130 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520 (1979)).
272. Id. at 575.
273. Id. at 576.
274. Id.
275. Id. The lower courts observed that other detention facilities had adopted much
less restrictive regulations governing the receipt of packages than did MCC. See United
States ex reL Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd in part, rev'd in part
sub nom. Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520 (1979). The district court required a showing "why there must be deprivations at the
MCC so much harsher than deemed necessary in other institutions." Id. (citing Procunier
v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 414 n.14 (1974)).
276. Cf Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 428 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that the warden's policy of using "impermissibly ambiguous" standards to deny prison-
ers' reading of certain publications actually gives the warden "virtually free rein to censor
incoming publications").
277. See Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 563 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "impact that
restrictions may have on inmates" should be part of the Court's analysis in balancing
against the "detention officials' justifications").
278. Wolfish, 439 F. Supp. at 147.
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guards.279 Even though governmental security interests are strongest
with respect to preventing dangerous weapons and contraband from
entering the prison, the Court rightfully paused in Wolfish, when in-
mates at all Bureau of Prison facilities were routinely required "to ex-
pose their body cavities for visual inspection as a part of a strip search
conducted after every contact visit with a person from outside the in-
stitution." 2 0 There was testimony that the procedures may leave per-
manent psychological scars.2al The practice was so "unpleasant,
embarrassing, and humiliating," and placed inmates in such a degrad-
ing position, that it caused some of them to forego visits with friends
and family altogether. 2  The Court hesitantly continued to permit
these searches, despite the potential for abuse and the invasion of the
inmates' personal privacy. 2 3 The majority's balancing test 284 to deter-
mine reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment gave way to one
critical factor: "A detention facility is a unique place fraught with seri-
ous security dangers."2 5 The Court regarded the discovery of one
incident of contraband smuggling in body cavities as a testament to
the searches' effectiveness, rather than as an argument against its
reasonableness. 28 6
Undoubtedly, this practice perpetuated the degradation and de-
humanization of the inmates. 87 Justice Marshall employed pragma-
tism and common sense in trying to influence those of his colleagues
who apparently favored giving absolute deference to the warden upon
279. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 577 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
280. Itt at 558. "If the inmate is a male, he must lift his genitals and bend over to spread
his buttocks for visual inspection. The vaginal and anal cavities of female inmates also are
visually inspected. The inmate is not touched by security personnel at any time during the
visual search procedure." Id. at 558 n.39 (citing Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 131 (2d Cir.
1978), rev'd sub nom. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)).
281. Wolfish, 439 F. Supp. at 147.
282. Id. at 146-47.
283. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 560. Although recognizing the potential invasion of an in-
mate's personal privacy, the Court concluded that visual body cavity inspections can "be
conducted on less than probable cause." Id.
284. Id. at 559.
In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against
the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the
scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justifi-
cation for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.
Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 577 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing psychiatric and other testimony which
suggests that strip searching places inmates in a degrading position and breeds fear of
sexual assault).
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his merely raising the specter of security.288 Marshall highlighted the
"bankruptcy" of the prison administration's position, finding indis-
criminate searches "so unnecessarily degrading that it 'shocks the con-
science.' '2 8 9 With his usual candor, he examined the record and
found far less need for routine body cavity searches. 9 °
The facts showed that before entering the visiting room, all visi-
tors had their packages searched by hand, metal detectors, and a flu-
oroscope.2 9 ' For an inmate to conceal any contraband not detected
by searching the visitor, an inmate would have had to remove half of
his one-piece, front-zippered jumpsuit while in plain view of guards
who continuously monitored the glass-enclosed visiting room. 9 2
Moreover, expert medical testimony suggested that inserting an object
into the rectum required time and opportunity not available in the
visiting room and that it would be painful.293 Of equal importance,
once an object was inserted, visual body cavity inspection probably
would not detect it.2 94 Furthermore, the lower court found that less
restrictive alternatives were available to ensure that contraband was
not transferred during visits. 295 Metal detectors could be used to dis-
29cover weapons. 96 Prisoners could be strip searched, their clothing
examined, and they could be required to present open hands and
arms to reveal the absence of concealed objects. 297 Justice Marshall
agreed with the district court that these alternative procedures amply
satisfied the demands of security.2 98
288. See id. at 579 (arguing that "unthinking deference" should not be given to "admin-
istrative convenience").
289. Id. at 578-79 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)).
290. Id. at 577-78.
291. Id. at 578.
292. Id. To further security, the locked lavatories were forbidden to the inmates, and
the visitors could only use them with permission. Id. at 578 n.18 (citing Wolfish v. Levi, 573
F.2d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)). The
lavatories also contained a built-in window for inspection. Id.
293. Id. at 578.
294. Id.
295. United States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 147-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd
in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
296. Id. at 147.
297. Id.
298. Wofish, 441 U.S. at 576-79 (Marshall,J., dissenting); see Wofish, 439 F. Supp. at 148;
see also Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 595 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (agreeing that the alternative proce-
dures identified by the district court satisfy security demands). Justice Powell joined the
majority except with respect to body cavity searches. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 563. He stated
that the serious intrusion on one's privacy occasioned by anal and genital searches re-
quired "at least some level of cause, such as a reasonable suspicion." Id.
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Justice Marshall was sensitive to the human aspect involved. He
focused on the practical consequences to the prisoner, condemning
the searches as blithely contributing to the prisoner's virtual degrada-
tion, either by design or neglect.2 99 It was difficult to believe that the
visual body cavity search was conducted solely for security reasons and
not also to purposefully demoralize and humiliate the inmate.30 Hu-
miliation, he was aware, had been an objective of the failed early
systems.30
1
The Wolfish majority permitted a prison practice that allowed not
only degradation of the prisoner, but also deprivation of the very ele-
ments necessary for reform.3°2 The hands-off doctrine had failed the
prisoners by abdicating jurisdiction, 0 3 and now the deferential
model, Justice Marshall believed, likewise failed by abandoning the
Court's responsibility.30 4
D. Cultivating Communication with Prisoners
1. By Correspondence: Maintaining Contacts with Family and
Friends.-The Court initially addressed First Amendment rights in the
prison context in Procunier v. Martinez, °3 in which the California De-
partment of Corrections's mail censorship regulations proscribed in-
mate correspondence that unduly complained; magnified grievances;
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion mentioned abolishing contact visits altogether.
Id. at 559-60 n.40. He expressed no view regarding the constitutionality of prohibiting
contact visits for pretrial detainees. Id. In Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984), the
Court continued to reinforce its severe limitations on detainees, holding that they may be
denied contact visits with their spouses, children, relations, and friends if the visits are
found to jeopardize security. Rutherford, 468 U.S. at 585-89. Security concerns also permit-
ted the majority to brusquely reject the challenge to the jail's policy of refusing to permit
the detainees to observe searches of their cells. Id. at 589-91.
299. See Rutherford, 468 U.S. at 596-608 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
300. For an excellent discussion of the humiliation rituals at Joliet prison see H. JACK
GRISWOLD ET AL., AN EYE FOR AN EYE 8-22 (1970).
301. In the early penitentiary system in order to maintain silence in the movement of
large numbers of inmates about the prisons, wardens created and subjected prisoners to
the degradation of the lockstep. See HARRY E. BARNER & NEGLEY K. TETERS, NEW HoRIzoNs
IN CRIMINOLOGY 351 (3d ed. 1959). Prisoners were out of step with society, and their physi-
cal movements were to be made as graceless as possible. See id. Each prisoner moved
silently, in a shuffle, his "right arm outstretched with the hand on the right shoulder of the
man in front of him." Id. Prisoners were "not permitted to hold their heads up, as would
befit free men." Id. With their heads turned to the right, and their eyes cast downward as
they shuffled forward, they were constantly reminded of their low estate. See id.
302. See Wolish, 441 U.S. at 577 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
303. See Wolish, 441 U.S. at 562 (explaining that courts have rejected the hands-off
approach).
304. See id. at 568, 579 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's test provides
"unthinking deference" to prison authorities).
305. 416 U.S. 396 (1974), overrded in part by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
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expressed inflammatory political, racial, religious, or other views or
beliefs; or contained matter deemed defamatory or otherwise inap-
propriate.3 °6 Prison employees screened both incoming and outgoing
personal mail for violation of these regulations.3 °7 The majority can-
didly recognized that the tension between the traditional policy ofju-
dicial restraint and the need to protect constitutional rights led courts
to adopt a variety of widely inconsistent solutions.3 0 8 In the case of
direct personal correspondence, the majority counseled that mail cen-
sorship implicates more than just the rights of the inmate. 0 9 Focus-
ing not on the rights of the prisoners, but on the inextricably meshed
interest in communication of the nonprisoner (friend or family mem-
ber), the Court emphasized that an undemanding standard of review
could not be harmonized with the fact that constitutional liberties of
free citizens are implicated by the censorship of prisoners' mail.310
The majority permitted censorship whenever it "further[ed] an im-
portant or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppres-
sion of expression" and "the limitation of First Amendment freedoms
[was] no greater than [was] necessary or essential to the protection of
the particular governmental interest involved." 11 The Court stressed
that censorship may not be used to simply eliminate unflattering opin-
ions or inaccurate statements. 312 Restraints on inmate correspon-
dence were permitted if used to preserve internal order and
discipline, "the maintenance of institutional security against escape or
unauthorized entry, and the rehabilitation of the prisoners. "313
Justice Marshall strove to breathe life into the constitutional pro-
tections for inmates. The common theme of the Justice's prison opin-
ions was the reality that, in the dehumanizing prison environment,
prisoners' yearnings for identity and self-respect are most compelling.
His Martinez opinion exemplified this theme, stating that prison au-
thorities do not have a general right to read inmates' mail as a matter
of course. 314 A prisoner does not shed such basic First Amendment
rights at the prison gate.31 - Marshall accorded prisoners this medium
of expression as a constitutionally guaranteed right, not as a privilege
306. Id. at 423 (Marshall, J., concurring).
307. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 400.
308. Id. at 406.
309. Id. at 408.
310. Id. at 408-09.
311. Id. at 413.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 412.
314. Id. at 422-28 (Marshall, J., concurring).
315. Id.
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handed out by the warden.3 16 Especially in the jail setting, "[t]o sup-
press expression is to reject the basic human desire for recognition
and affront the individual's worth and dignity. "317 Justice Marshall
spumed any policy that chilled the communication necessary for pris-
oners to inform the community about their existence and plight, find-
ing it at odds with "the most basic tenets of the guarantee of freedom
of speech."318
Possessing an instinct for the critical facts and a consummate
sense of the practical, Justice Marshall decimated the State's justifica-
tions for a general right to read all prisoners' correspondence. 1 9 To
the State's assertion that contraband may be smuggled into prison via
the mail, he countered that this certainly provided no justification for
reading outgoing mail. 2 ° As for incoming mail, it could be subjected
to physical tests such as fluoroscoping, and if a physical test were inad-
equate, merely opening and inspecting the mail would clearly
suffice. 21
To the suggestion that reading all prison mail was necessary to
detect escape plans, he countered that inmates engaged in un-
monitored personal interviews during which any number of surrepti-
tious plans might be discussed undetected. 22 Finally, he chaffed at
the argument that reading prisoners' mail is a useful rehabilitative
tool, responding that the weight of professional opinion is that an in-
mate's freedom to correspond with outsiders advances, rather than
retards, the goal of rehabilitation. 23 Justice Marshall concluded that
the chilling effect on free expression served no valid rehabilitative
purpose.3 24
Marshall knew that letter writing keeps the inmate in touch with
the outside world, helping him to eliminate the hopelessness and iso-
lation incurred in prison. 23 It stimulates natural human tendencies
316. Id. at 423. Rule 2401 of the Department of Corrections had as its basic premise
that "'[t]he sending and receiving of mail is a privilege, not a right.'" Martinez, 416 U.S. at
399 & n.1.
317. Id. at 427 (Marshall, J., concurring).
318. Id.
319. Id. at 422-28 (listing the reasons why the State's justifications for reading all corre-
spondence were not adequate).
320. Id. at 424.
321. Id. at 424-25.
322. Id. at 425.
323. Id. at 425-26. "Constructive, wholesome contact with the community is a valuable
therapeutic tool in the overall correctional process." Martine, 416 U.S. at 412 n.13 (quot-
ing Policy Statement 7300.1A, Federal Bureau of Prisons).
324. Id. at 425-26 (Marshall, J., concurring).
325. Id. at 426 (citing Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 791 (D.R.I. 1970)).
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and helps contribute to the better mental attitude and reformation of
the inmate. 26 Justice Marshall sent a straightforward message in Mar-
tine.z: The role of the Court is to protect these precious personal
rights by which the prisoner satisfies the "basic yearnings of the
human spirit." "'
326. Id.
327. Id. at 428. Although the Wofish majority admonished the judiciary to display great
deference to the judgment of prison administrators, there was still much disagreement as
to the appropriate standard to apply when prison regulations impinged on fundamental
constitutional rights. See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 597-98 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Wofish doctrine rests on a finding that no "fundamental lib-
erty interests" are implicated, and in a case where these interests are involved, the Wolfish
doctrine should not apply). The inmates in Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), challenged
a prison regulation that permitted correspondence between immediate family members
who are inmates at other correctional institutions and between inmates concerning legal
matters, but did not allow other inmate-to-inmate correspondence unless each inmate's
"classification/treatment team" approved. Id. at 82. In practice, the effect of the regula-
tion was to completely prohibit correspondence between nonrelated inmates. Id. (citation
omitted).
The Court acknowledged that its task was "to formulate a standard of review for pris-
oners' constitutional claims that is responsive both to the 'policy of judicial restraint re-
garding prisoner complaints and [to] the need to protect constitutional rights.'" Id. at 85
(quoting Martinez, 416 U.S. at 406). Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, after re-
viewing some of the Court's more recent prisoners' rights decisions, found in them the
makings of a general standard. Id. at 84-91. In none of these cases had the Court applied a
standard of "heightened scrutiny, but instead inquired whether a prison regulation that
burdens fundamental rights is 'reasonably related' to legitimate penological objectives, or
whether it represented an 'exaggerated response' to those concerns." Id. at 87. Justice
O'Connor concluded that the prohibition on correspondence was reasonably related to
valid corrections goals (institutional security) and not an exaggerated response to this con-
cern, and therefore, it did not unconstitutionally abridge the prisoner's First Amendment
rights. Id. at 93.
Justice Marshall joined in Justice Stevens's dissent characterizing the Turner standard
as virtually meaningless. Id. at 100 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Application of the standard
would seem to permit disregard for inmates' constitutional rights whenever the imagina-
tion of the warden produces a plausible security concern and a deferential trial court is
able to discern a logical connection between that concern and the challenged regulation."
Id. at 100-01. WhileJustice Marshall had challenged the Court to find ways to best protect
those few precious rights the prisoner retained, the Turner Court refused to break the
mold: deference was the plate du jure.
See also Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989), where prison regulations provided
that incoming publications may be rejected if prison officials found that the contents were
"'detrimental to . . . security, good order, or discipline,'" or "'might facilitate criminal
activity.'" Abbott, 490 U.S. at 404. The regulations authorized rejection of the entire publi-
cation, even ifjust one page of a book presented an intolerable security risk. Id. at 414-19.
The primary justification advanced for the rule was administrative convenience, because a
contrary rule would require laboriously going over each article in each publication and
defacing the material. Id. The Court, despite the apparent vagueness of the terms used in
the regulations, declared that the regulations were facially valid under Turner in order to
give prison authorities appropriate needed broad discretion. Id. at 419.
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2. By Family Contact Visitation.-Justice Marshall often character-
ized the Constitution's core value as the prevention of abuse of state
power. Among the relationships he tried to shield from state interfer-
ence were family bonds.3 28 Prison visits had long been recognized as
critically important," and Marshall instinctively understood the im-
portance of public knowledge and access to prisons for both the in-
mate, his family, and society.3"' In Kentucky Department of Corrections v.
Thompson, 31 the issue for him had been simple: "lIT] he basic need to
see family members and friends strikes at the heart of the liberty pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."332
Justice Marshall had a vision of prison reform that he kept in
mind as individual cases came before the Court. The ability of an
inmate to embrace his wife and children is exceptionally meaning-
ful,33 and denial of contact visitation in prison has very dramatic con-
sequences. 33 4 Therefore, when the Los Angeles County Central Jail
prohibited pretrial detainees contact visits with their families and
friends, Justice Marshall recognized that the jail policy risked a signifi-
cant injury to familial relations.333 In Block v. Rutherford, 36 he was af-
forded the opportunity to examine prison practices and how they
interfaced with the emotional and physical well-being of the pris-
oner.337 He found substantial evidence to support the findings that
contact visitation was crucial to maintaining family bonds and that its
For a fuller discussion of Turner and its progeny, see Gutterman, supra note 21, at 890-
95, 897-98 (criticizing Turner and Abbott for once again giving the warden free rein to cen-
sor what prisoners read).
328. See Rutherford, 468 U.S. at 599 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that the risk of
injury posed to family relations by the jail's policy requires that the Court employ a more
constraining standard than the doctrine applied in Wolfish).
329. See Leonard G. Leverson, Constitutional Limits on the Power to Restrict Access to Prisons:
An Historical Re-examination, 18 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rxv. 409, 413 & n.20 (1983) (discussing
the ease of access to English prisons in the seventeenth century and the importance of easy
access to obtaining habeas corpus relief).
330. See Rutherford, 468 U.S. at 598-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting the importance
of access to prisons for the inmate, his family, and society).
331. 490 U.S. 454 (1989). For a discussion of Thompson, see supra notes 162-178 and
accompanying text.
332. Id. at 466 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
333. See Rutherford, 468 U.S. at 598 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
334. See id.
335. See id. (arguing that the denial of visitation between inmates and relatives can con-
tribute to the deterioration of family relationships).
336. 468 U.S. 576 (1983).
337. Id. at 598-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (detailing how the prison's policy may affect
the emotional well-being of the prisoner).
187
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denial contributed to the break-up of inmate marriages, grievously
threatening an inmate's mental health. 338
Justice Marshall had been in the pit; he knew how to read a rec-
ord and its implications. Looking at the evidence, he challenged the
majority's conclusion that the Central Jail's blanket prohibition on
contact visits was a reasonable nonpunitive response to a legitimate
security concern. 33 9 He saw no reason why security procedures effec-
tively used at other institutions could not be implemented at the
County Jail. 4 ' Specifically, prisoners could be dressed in special
clothes for visitation, and searches could be conducted both before
and after the visit.3 4 Visitors could be required to pass through metal
detectors and fluoroscopes, and guards could continuously observe
the visiting area.34" Furthermore, parcels could be excluded from the
visitation area, and visitors who did not comply with the rules could be
ejected. 1 3 Marshall agreed with the experts who testified that these
procedures would "'prevent everything except the most extreme
methods of introducing drugs into the institution.' ' 3
Justice Marshall's theory jeopardized the majority's central thesis:
absolute deference to the reasonable judgment of prison officials. 345
The Rutherford opinion, written by Chief Justice Burger, again empha-
sized the passive role the courts should play in the administration of
detention facilities. 46 The Chief Justice maintained that when spe-
cific restrictions are "reasonably related" to security interests, the Wolf-
ish principle controls, and wide-ranging deference to prison
administration policies must be accorded. 47 The Chief Justice virtu-
ally ignored the importance of alternatives to accomplish the jail's se-
curity concerns; in his judgment, any further balance would merely
substitute the Court's view of proper jail administration for that of the
facility's experienced administrators. 48
The Chief Justice's reasoning was precisely what Justice Marshall
had feared would be the outcome of Wolfish. For Marshall, unthink-
338. Id. at 598.
339. Id. at 604.
340. Id. at 602.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 596 (arguing that the majority's opinion is guided by "an unwarranted confi-
dence in the good faith and 'expertise' of prison administrators").
346. Id. at 584-85 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540-41 n.23 (1979) (quoting Pell
v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974))).
347. Id.
348. Id. at 588.
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ing deference to administrative justifications precluded any meaning-
ful consideration of the most significant factor: the impact the
restriction may have on inmates.349 Justice Marshall did not discount
prison security concerns, but in his view the significant injury to family
relations wrought by denying contact visitation required a standard
more constraining than Wolfish.350 Marshall unsuccessfully tried to
persuade his colleagues that jail security could be accomplished with-
out a total ban on contact visitation."' He viewed the Court's primary
objective not as ensuring appropriate deference to prison officials, but
rather as guaranteeing a justification for infringing inmates' rights.
Against this standard, Marshall determined the jail policy fell short.352
He concluded the prison officials demonstrated their inability to ad-
349. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 563 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78
(1987), framed the standard of review, delineating the boundaries within which the debate
must take place. Id. at 89-91. See supra note 327 for a discussion of Turner.
One week after deciding Turner, the Court applied its "reasonableness" standard to
state correctional policies that impinged on the prisoners' interest in freely exercising their
religious rights. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987). Because unac-
ceptable security risks and administrative burdens resulted from the return of outside work
details during the day, a new policy memorandum prohibited inmates assigned to outside
work details from returning to the prison during the day except in the case of an emer-
gency. See id. at 346-47. In Shabazz, Muslim inmates challenged the prison policies that
had the incidental effect of preventing them from attendingJumu'ah, the primary congre-
gational service of their faith held on Fridays. Id. at 347. ChiefJustice Rehnquist deter-
mined that the Court of Appeals was clearly wrong when it required the state to show that
it had made a bona fide inquiry into whether reasonable methods exist by which the pris-
oners' religious rights can be accommodated without creating security problems. Id. at
350. The Court of Appeals believed that:
Where it is found that reasonable methods of accommodation can be adopted
without sacrificing either the state's interest in security or the prisoners' interest
in freely exercising their religious rights, the state's refusal to allow the obser-
vance of a central religious practice cannot be justified and violates the prisoners'
first amendment rights.
Shabazz v. O'Lone, 782 F.2d 416, 420 (3d Cir. 1986) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. O'Lone v.
Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). However, the ChiefJustice firmly declared that this
approach had failed "to reflect the respect and deference that the United States Constitu-
tion allows for the judgment of prison administrators." Shabazz, 482 U.S. at 350. Although
mutual accommodation is relevant to the reasonableness inquiry, prison administrators,
Justice Rehnquist reasoned, do not "'have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable
alternative method of accommodating the claimant's constitutional complaint.'" Id. (quot-
ing Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91).
Applying the new Turner standard, Justice Rehnquist found that the new policy was
related to legitimate security concerns. Id. at 351. Furthermore, the Muslim inmates' abil-
ity to participate in other religious observance of their faith gave added credence to the
determination that the restrictions were reasonable. Id. For a fuller discussion of Shabazz,
see Gutterman, supra note 21, at 895-98.
350. Rutherford, 468 U.S. at 598 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
351. Id. at 602 (identifying a list of precautions used at other institutions that do not
resort to total bans on contact visitation).
352. Id. at 607-08.
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vance a substantial security interest when they refused to adopt the
specific reforms ordered by the lower courts.3 5
VII. THE NEW VOICES IN PRISON REFORM
Justice Marshall's pivotal role as a prison reform advocate pro-
vides the central theme for many of the Court's new voices. The mer-
its of his prison jurisprudence have found their mark, as some hesitant
allies on the present Court have begun to echo his views.3 54 A good
example is Helling v. McKinney, 55 in which the Court revisited medical
issues-this time the health hazard posed by involuntary exposure of a
nonsmoking prison inmate to the environmental tobacco smoke
(ETS) of his five-packs-a-day smoking cellmate.356  The Court,
presented with an opportunity to adopt an expansive reading of the
Eighth Amendment in the prison context, knew what really was at
stake in Helling. the right of a prisoner to look toward the future.357
Justice White, writing for a seven-member majority, 358 considered
prospective physical harm as part of the constitutional calculus.3 59
White rejected the government's central thesis that only "deliberate
indifference" to an inmate's current, serious health problems is en-
compassed within the protection of the Eighth Amendment. 6 ° For
Justice White, it was not an unusual proposition that the Eighth
Amendment protects inmates from future harm. He believed that un-
safe, life-threatening conditions need not await a tragic event to re-
quire a remedy.361
353. Id. at 601.
354. See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2303 (1995) (Ginsburg,J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Due Process Clause itself, not the state's prison code, is the wellspring of
the protection due a prisoner in remaining free of disciplinary segregation). "Deriving
protected liberty interests from mandatory language in local prison codes would make of
the fundamental right something more in certain States, something less in others." Id.; see
supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text.
Note also the view ofJustice Breyer, with whom Justice Souterjoined, that it is fairly
clear that solitary disciplinary segregation for 30 days was prison punishment which de-
prived the inmate of constitutionally protected "liberty." See Conner, 115 S. Ct. at 2305
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
355. 509 U.S. 25 (1993).
356. Id. at 28.
357. "That the Eighth Amendment protects against future harm to inmates is not a
novel proposition." Id. at 33.
358. Justice White was joined in his opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist and by Justices
Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. Id. at 26.
359. Id. at 33 (arguing that the "Eighth Amendment protects against future harm").
360. Id. at 33-34.
361. Id. at 33 (noting that "[i]t would be odd to deny an injunction to inmates who
plainly proved an unsafe, life-threatening condition . . . on the ground that nothing yet
had happened to them").
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The Helling decision manifested a sharp alteration in the Court's
attitude, moving it toward Justice Marshall's theory of prisons. As the
majority in Helling made clear, the Eighth Amendment prohibits
prison conditions that pose a grave and imminent threat to prisoners'
future health.36 ' The Court ruled that scientific and statistical evi-
dence alone was insufficient proof;363 also required was an assessment
that the risk of harm was so grave that it violated contemporary stan-
dards of decency.3 64 Two terms later, in Farmer v. Brennan,3 65 Justice
Souter, building upon Helling, acknowledged that prison rape is not
constitutionally tolerable and that "[b]eing violently assaulted in
prison is simply not 'part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for
their offenses against society."'3 66 Although not specifying the point
at which the risk of inmate assault becomes sufficiently intolerable for
Eighth Amendment purposes, Farmer required prison officials to pro-
tect prisoners from the violence of other prisoners.3 67 Farmer sent a
clear message to corrections officials that they now had an affirmative
duty to provide a safe environment for their inmates-a duty that the
Court would not take lightly.3 68
362. Id. at 35. In Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994), the Court reconfirmed that a
prisoner may obtain preventive relief. Id. at 1974. The subjective awareness factor in the
deliberate indifference test does not require prisoners to suffer physical injury before ob-
taining court-ordered correctional relief for inhumane prison conditions. Id at 1983-84.
363. Helling, 509 U.S. at 36.
364. Id. "[T]he prisoner must show that the risk of which he complains is not one that
today's society chooses to tolerate." Id. The requirement of a smoke-free environment has
gained support in this country. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 41706 (1994) (prohibiting smoking on
domestic airline flights).
365. 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994).
366. Id. at 1977 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
367. Id. at 1976. Justice Souter, in Farmer, regarded as incompatible with Wilson a read-
ing of the Eighth Amendment that would allow liability to be imposed on prison officials
solely because of the presence of objectively inhuman prison conditions and required in-
stead that responsibility be based on a consciousness of risk. Id. at 1979-80. Determining
that "deliberate indifference" lies somewhere between the poles of "negligence" at one end
and "purpose or knowledge" at the other end, Justice Souter adopted the "familiar" crimi-
nal law standard of subjective recklessness as consistent with the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause. Id. "[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference." Id. at 1979. Whether the prison official had the subjective awareness is a ques-
tion of fact. Reasonable prison officials will recognize risks that are obvious, but the infer-
ence cannot be conclusive, "'for we know that people are not always conscious of what
reasonable people would be conscious of.'" Id. at 1981 (quoting 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
AuSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 3.7, at 335 (1986)).
Except for Justice Marshall's successor, Justice Thomas, all members of the Court
joined injustice Souter's opinion. Id. at 1974.
368. Id. at 1986 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun issued a stern warning
that corrections officials face a "serious risk" of civil liability if they fail to prevent inmates
from being physically assaulted and raped. Id. at 1989.
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Helling and Farmer are less than consistent with the Court's philos-
ophy of judicial restraint. 69 Justice Marshall had advocated that
prison officials' actions be subject to closer judicial scrutiny. Today,
after Helling and Farmer, prison officials may no longer have broad,
unchecked power over prisoners' lives. As Justice Marshall hoped,
prisoners may now envision a future.37 °
Furthermore, the Eighth Amendment was not limited to protect-
ing against physical mistreatment. 371 Prison conditions affect more
than inmates' bodies. Prisons also pose a serious risk of psychological
Justice Thomas adhered to his belief that "judges or juries-but not jailers-impose
"punishment."'" Id. at 1990 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Helling, 509 U.S. at 40
(Thomas, J., dissenting)). Therefore, the sexual attack that Farmer incurred was not part
of his sentence, and it did not constitute "punishment" under the Eighth Amendment. Id.
369. Compare supra notes 89-104 and accompanying text with notes 362-368 and accom-
panying text.
370. It is both instructive and interesting to note the contrasting views ofJustice Clar-
ence Thomas, Marshall's successor, and only the second African American to sit on the
Supreme Court. In his dissent in Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992),Justice Thomas,
was concerned that by allowing an inmate to recover damages from correctional officials
absent a showing of serious injury, the Court was turning the Eighth Amendment into a
"National Code of Prison Regulation." Id. at 28 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Employing similar reasoning, Justice Thomas in his dissent in Helling argued that the
Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause applied only to penalties
imposed by statute or sentence and not to those punishments that prison authorities may
inflict on inmates. Helling, 509 U.S. at 38-41 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Justice con-
tended that neither historical evidence nor 185 years of precedent prior to Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97 (1976), suggested that harsh penalties may constitute cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. Helling, 509 U.S. at 40. Justice Thomas hinted that given the right circumstances
he would vote to overrule Estelle. Id. at 42.
Justice Thomas repeated this theme in Farmer, discerning that prisons are necessarily
dangerous places housing antisocial and violent people, and regrettably "'[s]ome level of
brutality and sexual aggression among [prisoners] is inevitable,'" whatever actions correc-
tional officials may take. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1990 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Mc-
Gill v. Duckworth, 99 F.2d 334, 348 (7th Cir. 1991)). He accused the Court of trying to
rectify these unfortunate conditions by refining the "'National Code of Prison Regulation,'
otherwise known as the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause." Id. (citing Hudson, 503
U.S. at 28). Justice Thomas criticized the majority for its continued reliance on Estelle, the
Court's first prison conditions case, which was guided "not by the text of the Constitution,
but rather by 'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'"
Id. (quoting Estetle, 429 U.S. at 102). The logical result of continuing along this path,
Justice Thomas was convinced, "is to transform federal judges into superintendents of pris-
ons nationwide." Id. at 1990-91.
371. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). The Supreme Court
concluded that termination of citizenship destroyed the individual's status in society and
was "more primitive than torture." See id. Many federal courts have equated the deteriora-
tion of a prisoner's mental and emotional well-being with punishment. See, e.g., Palmigi-
ano v. Garrachy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 979 (D.R.I. 1977) (arguing that inmates have basic
constitutional rights to be free from conditions that cause their physical and mental deteri-
oration); Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 307 (D.N.H. 1977) (stating that the
Eighth Amendment protections extend beyond punishment of the physical body and in-
clude the whole person as a human being).
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damage without any corresponding physical injury.3 72 Justice Black-
mun clearly recognized this, and to ensure that psychological harm is
included in the Eighth Amendment calculus, he emphasized that
such harm can be clinically diagnosed and quantified through well-
established means.373 Because the Court in Helling did not hesitate to
include future physical harm within the Eighth Amendment's orbit,
its theory might also encompass potential psychological damage. 74
Medically, potential physiological and psychological risks are inter-
twined, one nourishing the other.
On the periphery, as Justice Marshall envisioned, is the need for
rehabilitative treatment.375 Prison conditions affect more than just
the inmate's body; they may also affect the inmate's ability to make
moral choices-to become self-determining.3 76 A lack of rehabilita-
tive programs obviates the possibility of choice. Inadequate opportu-
nities for rehabilitation contribute to physical and mental
deterioration.377 Tension and anxiety caused by fear of physical and
372. See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 598 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing
testimony from a psychiatrist, arguing that denial of visitation to prisoners "generally
threatens their mental health") (citation omitted); see also supra notes 278-304 and accom-
panying text.
373. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 16-17 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("'Pain' in its ordinary
meaning surely includes a notion of psychological harm.").
374. Helling, 509 U.S. at 25.
375. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 425-26 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(arguing that freedom from censorship of prisoners' mail advances the goal of rehabilita-
tion). Justice Brennan also seemingly considers rehabilitation as part of the constitutional
equation. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 364 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(arguing that if prison conditions combine to defeat rehabilitation by creating a
probability of recidivism they violate the Constitution). He would find prison conditions
unconstitutional when " 'the cumulative impact of the conditions of incarceration threat-
ens the physical, mental, and emotional health and well-being of the inmates and/or cre-
ates a probability of recidivism and future incarceration.'" See id. (quoting Laaman, 437 F.
Supp. at 323).
Note, however, the court's comment in Holt v. Sarver
This Court knows that a sociological theory or idea may ripen into constitutional
law; many such theories and ideas have done so. But, this Court is not prepared
to say that such a ripening has occurred as yet as far as rehabilitation of convicts is
concerned. Given an otherwise unexceptional penal institution, the Court is not
willing to hold that confinement in it is unconstitutional simply because the insti-
tution does not operate a school, or provide vocational training, or other rehabili-
tative facilities and services which many institutions now offer.
Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 379 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (mem.), affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir.
1971).
376. See Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 325-26 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (mem.), affd en banc
sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part per curiam sub nom.
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (arguing that an inhumane prison environment
leaves no opportunity for rehabilitation and makes dehabilitation inevitable).
377. See id. at 326.
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sexual attacks and callousness among correctional staff lead to the de-
generation of the inmate's attitude and emotional stability."'
The lower federal courts identified not merely deterrence and
retribution, but also rehabilitation as legitimate policies and goals of
the corrections system. 79 Justice Marshall understood that in most
penal institutions rehabilitative programs are more an ideal than a
reality.38 ° Although the therapeutic model of corrections has come
under increasing criticism, for Marshall, prison practices that inhibit
reformation just would not do. For example, in Martinez, when cor-
rectional authorities asserted that reading prisoners' mail was a useful
rehabilitative tool, Justice Marshall summarily rejected the penologi-
cal justification. 8 1 He recognized that "[t]he mails provide one of
the few ties inmates retain to their communities or families-ties es-
sential to the success of their later return to the outside world."3 82
Justice Marshall foundJudge Kaufman's observations particularly apro-
pos: letter writing stimulates the inmate's natural human impulses and
contributes to his better mental attitude and reformation. 83 Marshall
likewise believed that "'[t] he harm censorship [of letters] does to re-
habilitation . .. cannot be gainsaid."'" 4
Recent decisions such as Helling and Farmer mark a significant
step toward vesting prisoners with constitutional rights, not merely to
safe and healthy living conditions, but to protection from future harm
to their psyche. The Eighth Amendment necessitates that prison offi-
cials provide inmates with food, shelter, and warmth, 85 but it may also
require more: an opportunity for redemption consistent with current
societal standards.3 8 6 The balancing of punishment principles deter-
378. See id. at 325-26 (noting that the "rampant violence and jungle atmosphere" can
lead to more violence, as well as to "physical and mental degeneration").
379. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974). Totally inadequate opportu-
nities for rehabilitation contribute to the physical and mental deterioration.
380. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 425 (1974) (Marshall,J., concurring),
overruled in part by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
381. Id. at 426.
382. Id. (citing Comparative Analysis of Standards and Goals of the National Advisory Commis-
sion on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals with Standards for Criminal Justice of the ABA, 1973
A.B.A. Sec. Criminal Justice 67-68).
383. Id. (citing Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 199 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc)).
384. Id. at 426 & n.l1 (quoting Sostre, 442 F.2d at 199 (quoting Richard G. Singer, Cen-
sorship of Prisoners' Mail and the Constitution, 56 A.B.A.J. 1051, 1054 (1970))).
385. See supra note 233.
386. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 364 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stat-
ing that opportunity for educational and rehabilitative programming is to be considered in
determining whether prison conditions violate the Constitution).
[VOL. 56:149
1997] THE PRISON JURISPRUDENCE OF THURGOOD MARSHALL 195
mines the choice of constitutional restraints.38 7 The courts sentence
citizens to jail. When the conditions in prison bear no relationship to
the sentencing function, the sentence is pointless. If rehabilitation is
truly a goal of confinement, courts are responsible for carrying out
this purpose and should intervene when prison practices make it
impossible. 88
The public is generally apathetic about prisons.3 89 However,
studies have shown that most people are horrified when they learn of
the savage living conditions that exist in some of the worst jails.39 0
Justice Marshall believed that the Eighth Amendment's evolving stan-
dards of decency emerge from an informed citizenry, and that by edu-
cating the public about prison conditions, their opinions could be
altered.3 9 1 Through his opinions, he tried to enlighten the American
public regarding the horrendous practices in prison. He was all too
aware that corrections officials exercise extensive, largely invisible,
power over inmates; not subject to public scrutiny, there is a tremen-
dous potential for abuse by those officials.392 He recognized the enor-
mous institutional responsibility that inheres in the administration of
government-sanctioned punishment and the Court's integral part in
the process. His primary goal was confinement with dignity. In case
after case, Justice Marshall emphasized that it is the judiciary's obliga-
tion to enforce the rights of the politically powerless; for as far as he
was concerned, this is the heart of the American system.
387. See Bruce R. Jacob, Prison Discipline and Inmate Rights, 5 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 227,
272 (1970) (arguing that the role of the courts in determining constitutional treatment
varies with the objective of confinement).
388. See id. (stating that when rehabilitation is the objective of confinement, the judici-
ary should accept at least partial responsibility for implementing that objective).
389. See Feldberg, supra note 23, at 380.
390. See id. at 380-81 (citing RESOURCE CENTER FOR CORRECTIONAL LAW & LEGAL SERV-
ICES, COMM. ON CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES & SERVICES, ABA, AFTER DECISION: IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF JUDICIAL DECREES IN CORRECTIONAL SETrINGS 7-9 (1976)).
391. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 232 (1976) (Marshall,J., dissenting) (arguing
that the constitutionality of the death penalty turns "on the opinion of an informed
citizenry").
392. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 565-66 (noting that the motivation for policy deci-
sions by prison officials that affect the treatment of prisoners "will frequently not be a
matter of public record").
